



European  
Payments Council

# Guidelines on cryptographic algorithms usage and key management

EPC342-08 / Version 10.0 / Produced by PSSG / Date issued: 8 March 2021

*This document defines guidelines on cryptographic algorithms usage and key management.*

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# Guidelines

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and key management

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European  
Payments Council

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## Document History

This document was first produced by ECBS as TR 406, with its latest ECBS version published in September 2005. The document has been handed over to the EPC which is responsible for its yearly maintenance.

### **DISCLAIMER:**

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## Executive Summary

The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to the European payments industry, in the field of cryptographic algorithms and related key management issues.

It has been written mainly for payment service providers: security officers, risk managers, systems engineers and systems designers. Although its reading does not assume expertise in cryptology, it contains some sections which require a basic mathematical background.

There is constant progress in the science of cryptology, either to create new algorithms or to break existing ones, such that any recommendation on cryptographic algorithms and key management is liable to become obsolete before it is published. Also, it is usually an over-simplification to categorise an algorithm or key management technique as being either 'good' or 'bad'. In practice, some are weaker or stronger, and some are subject to one or another type of attack, depending on how and for what they are used.

Consequently, the choice of a cryptographic technique to protect data should always be the result of a risk assessment process. This process should consider not only the potential loss in case the cryptographic technique fails to prevent an attack, but also the operational conditions that may allow some kinds of attacks and prevent others. For example, algorithms, which are subject to known plaintext/ciphertext attacks when used in a certain way, may be strong enough if used in another way that does not allow the attacker to access an adequate sample of plaintexts and matching ciphertexts.

As most algorithms are subject to attacks that would succeed given sufficient time, this risk assessment should consider the period during which data must be protected. Using a cryptographic algorithm, which is considered as weak by the specialists may be a bad policy decision as it may alter the reputation of a financial institution, although it may have no operational consequences for many systems.

A system using cryptography should always be designed with a possible algorithm migration in mind. Nevertheless, the cost and difficulty of migrating from one algorithm to another (or of changing the size of the keys) should not be underestimated.

This document specifies a number of recommendations and best practices on cryptographic algorithms, security protocols, confidentiality and integrity protection and key management in section 1, for which further detailed background information may be found in the subsequent sections of the document.

Finally, when implementing and integrating cryptography into protocols or schemes, although algorithms, key sizes and randomness of key material are essential, other security implementation aspects beyond the scope of this document become equally important such as side-channel countermeasures and protocol layer interdependency checking.

With the publication of this new version of the document, various updates have been made regarding the usage of some algorithms based on recent developments in cryptography since the publication of version 9.0. Also the sections on quantum computing considerations, distributed ledger technology, and security protocols have been reviewed and updated as needed, including new background information.



In producing these guidelines, the EPC aims to provide a reference basis to support payment service providers. However, it needs to be recognised that research and developments in cryptology are constantly evolving. Therefore, the EPC plans to annually review and update the document to reflect the state of the art in light of major new developments and to keep it aligned with the documents referenced.



## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Scope of the document

This document is aimed to provide guidance to the European payments community on algorithm usage and key management issues.

It contains some recommendations from EPC on algorithm usage and key management issues that the payment service providers may consider together with their own security policy and the relevant professional or national rules and regulations they have to comply with.

These guidelines recommend use of International Standards where appropriate.

It also addresses the points that should be considered whenever payment service providers wish to provide interoperable services based on cryptographic mechanisms. These points may be of particular interest for secured cross-border services.

The scope of this document is limited to cryptographic algorithms and key management. Amongst the mechanisms excluded from its scope are:

- error detecting mechanisms such as Cyclic Redundancy Check,
- data compression facilities such as Zip or Huffman coding,
- side-channel countermeasures and protocol layer interdependency checking,
- secret algorithms, for which no technical features are available.

The world of cryptography being wide and rapidly expanding, this document focuses on algorithms which are suitable for payment services, and which are already adopted by the financial industry or which are likely to be in the foreseeable future.

In order to cope with the rapid evolution of the technology, this report is updated yearly.

### 1.2 Document structure

Section 1 specifies the scope of this document, contains the list of “Recommendations” and “Implementation best practices” and describes the structure of the document. Those recommendations and best practices are further elaborated in the remainder of the document.

Section 2 provides an introduction to cryptographic primitives and a taxonomy for cryptographic algorithms and their typical usage.

Section 3 discusses design issues for constructing cryptographic mechanisms from cryptographic primitives and describes implementation and interoperability issues.

Section 4 deals with key management for symmetric and asymmetric algorithms and introduces the topic of key escrow and key recovery.

Section 5 treats briefly the generation of random numbers.

**ANNEX I** contains definitions of terms used in this document and lists most of the acronyms used.

**ANNEX II** contains a bibliographical list of the textbooks, publications or standards (either international, national or de facto) referenced.





### 1.3 Recommendations

This section summarises the recommendations made throughout the document, in the order they appear in the document. Further background information to these recommendations may be found in the main sections of the document:

Crypto algorithms	
Rec 1	Only algorithms whose specifications have been publicly scrutinised (ideally with a public design phase), and whose strength has been assessed by crypto experts can be recommended. Algorithms specified in International Standards should be preferred. This recommendation also applies to algorithms for key generation.
Rec 2 Symmetric algorithms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AES is the recommended standard for new systems.</li> <li>• 3TDES is still acceptable in use cases where there is no concern regarding reduced block sizes.</li> <li>• 2TDES may still be acceptable for legacy systems under specific conditions (see 3.1.4); plans should be made to migrate to AES.</li> <li>• Single DES (56 bits) should be considered broken.</li> </ul> <p>Further details are provided in sections 3.1.2.4 and 3.1.4.</p>
Rec 3 Public Key algorithms	<p>Except for systems where computational or data storage capacities are restricted, or where a strategic long-term migration is needed, there is no strong reason to move from RSA to ECC- based signature schemes.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.1.3.3.</p>
Rec 4 Public Key algorithms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No longer use RSA keys of 768 bits and ECC keys of 130 bits, or less.</li> <li>• Avoid using 1024-bit RSA keys and 160-bit ECC keys for new applications unless for short term low value protection (e.g. ephemeral authentication for single devices).</li> <li>• Use at least 2048-bit RSA or 224-bit ECC for medium term (e.g. 10 year) protection (see [191]).</li> <li>• For considerations regarding low exponent RSA, section 3.1.3 should be consulted.</li> <li>• New systems should be designed with the agility to introduce PQC algorithms as and when they are standardised (see 3.1.5).</li> </ul> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.1.4.</p>
Rec 5	<p>In view of quantum computing, if long term confidentiality (that is, for several decades) is needed then use a 16-byte block cipher such as AES with a 256-bit key. AES-128 will remain fit-for-purpose for lower grade requirements.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.1.5.</p>
Rec 6 Message Authentication	Although many legacy systems currently still use MACs based on DES or TDES, new systems should use CMAC based on AES, or HMAC.



Code (MAC)	Further details are provided in section 3.2.4.
Rec 7 Distributed ledgers	<p>Financial service providers that decide to deploy distributed ledger-based services or processes should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confirm the security properties afforded by the distributed ledger to its users.</li> <li>• Identify the cryptographic primitives used to validate and commit changes to the ledger and confirm the status of cryptanalysis targeting these primitives.</li> <li>• Identify the consensus protocol used to commit changes to the ledger and assess the feasibility of a successful consensus hijack attack.</li> </ul> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.2.7.</p>
<b>Security protocols</b>	
Rec 8	<p>In designing a security protocol, the following should be identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the security service provided.</li> <li>• the entities involved.</li> <li>• the security verification values (MACs, hashes, digital signatures, ...) that will need to be generated and verified.</li> <li>• the algorithms and their modes of operation.</li> <li>• the key material to be generated.</li> <li>• the random number generators to be used (e.g. key generation, challenges, padding).</li> <li>• the key establishment material (this could be key names, encrypted session keys, public key certificates or certificate references, initialisation vectors if any, ...).</li> <li>• unambiguous definition of the data used as input in the cryptographic mechanisms.</li> <li>• the formatting techniques used in the signature generation/verification process.</li> <li>• the transformation techniques used to represent binary data (known as filtering), if any.</li> </ul> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.4.</p>
Rec 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use TLS with secure cryptographic primitives and appropriate key sizes (c.f. 3.1.3.4).</li> <li>• Enable TLS 1.3 support in all new systems (offers forward-secrecy by default).</li> <li>• Enforce the use of TLS 1.2 or higher for all use cases (preferably with ephemeral cipher suites).</li> <li>• Do not use TLS versions older than TLS 1.2 because of known and exploitable vulnerabilities (unless such use is approved in specific use cases through ongoing security risk assessment).</li> </ul>



Confidentiality and integrity protection	
Rec 10	<p>To achieve confidentiality and integrity protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For the originator, sign the plaintext data first for legal signature (if required), then compress (if required), then apply authenticated encryption with the non-confidential data being treated as associated data (not encrypted).</li> <li>• For the recipient, perform the steps in the reverse order. Verify that signatures are from an authentic source.</li> <li>• The encryption and signature/MAC can be performed as separate steps, or can be achieved by use of authenticated encryption (which also allows the use of traditional encrypt-then-MAC) or signcryption.</li> </ul> <p>Further details are provided in section 3.4.</p>
Key management	
Rec 11	<p>If a master key needs to be backed-up outside of a TRSM then it should be split into key components in a secure and resilient manner. Secret sharing techniques should be used to allow recovery of the master key from all or a fixed number (threshold) of the master key components. The security level of the storage of the master key components should be commensurate with the protection afforded the operational master key itself.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.1.2.</p>
Rec 12	<p>Symmetric keys should be dedicated to one usage (e.g. encryption or MAC computation, but not both).</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.1.5.</p>
Rec 13	<p>Key usage controls (e.g., making use of control vectors, key wrapping) which bind the key to key control information in a secure way should be employed.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.1.5.</p>
Rec 14	<p>Keys should be generated inside a TRSM and private keys should never exist in clear text outside a TRSM.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.1.</p>
Rec 15	<p>Where appropriate, public keys are to be distributed such that their integrity and the binding with the owner are preserved (e.g., by using certificates).</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.4.</p>
Rec 16	<p>Usage of X 509, version 3, format certificates is recommended.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.4.</p>
Rec 17	<p>When verifying a digital signature, users should check that the certificate status (either valid, expired or revoked) when the signature was generated does not make it invalid. When a certification path is involved,</p>



	<p>this verification should be performed for every certificate of the path up to the root certificate. Efficient verification may require that the date and time when the signature was produced is unambiguously defined.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.7.</p>
Rec 18	<p>Whenever possible, trusted time sources should be used, in order to allow reliable verification of certificate validity.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.7.</p>
Rec 19	<p>An asymmetric key pair should be dedicated to one usage, for instance: one of entity authentication, non-repudiation of data, symmetric keys encryption.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.2.8.</p>
Rec 20	<p>Where possible, payment service providers should avoid the use of key escrow, but key recovery is part of their due diligence and business continuity obligations.</p> <p>Further details are provided in section 4.3.</p>

Table 1: Recommendations

### 1.4 Implementation best practices

In addition to the recommendations listed in the previous section, the following best practices with respect to implementations of cryptographic techniques need to be emphasised.

Data confidentiality	
BP 1	<p>For assuring confidentiality of data, symmetric block cipher algorithms are still the best choice. They are subject to attacks, made easier if the secret key is short. Any legacy system using 56-bit keys (i.e. single DES) should now have been replaced. 2TDES is still appropriate for legacy applications under certain circumstances (e.g. limited key use or data protection time). AES using 128-bit keys is today's recommended standard for new applications. Additionally, the use of three-key Triple DES is acceptable. In all cases, the secret key crypto period should be as short as possible and therefore usage of non-reusable session keys should always be preferred. See also Recommendations 2, 4 and section 3.1.4.</p>
Data integrity	
BP 2	<p>For assuring data integrity migration towards SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, (collectively known as the SHA-2 family), Whirlpool or SHA-3 is strongly encouraged (see section 3.1.1.1). Alternatively, a symmetric algorithm MAC computed with a secret key may be used. And this may also provide data origin authentication. When a symmetric algorithm MAC is used, similar considerations on the length of the key as for confidentiality apply and the use of AES is preferred (see section 3.2.4).</p>
Data integrity and origin authentication	
BP 3	<p>For assuring data integrity and data origin authentication (which are the bases to provide non-repudiation of origin), an asymmetric algorithm and a hash function based digital signature is recommended. Hash functions such as SHA-2, Whirlpool</p>



	<p>or SHA-3 are preferred (see section 3.1.1.1). Older hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-1 are not recommended (especially if non-repudiation with hash function collision resistance is needed). When protection is needed for medium term then applications will need to support RSA digital signatures with at least 2048-bit moduli (see section 3.1.4). Elliptic Curve DSA algorithms are now being adopted on the grounds of smaller key sizes and signing efficiency (patents may apply on newer techniques).</p>
<b>Key management</b>	
BP 4	<p>Key management for asymmetric algorithms requires distribution of authenticated public keys and secured storage of private keys. The best solution to the first requirement is to use certificates, however this leads to the problems of certificate management and of establishment of Certification Authorities. For secured storage of private keys, different techniques are possible, the use of smart cards with RSA capability being one already widely adopted (see section 4.2).</p>
BP 5	<p>Keys (either symmetric or asymmetric key pairs) should be dedicated to one purpose only. For instance, separate symmetric keys should be used for MAC computation and for confidentiality, and an asymmetric key pair should be dedicated to digital signature or for key encryption. Amongst the benefits of such a policy are: design flexibility, facilitation of exploiting audit trails, simplification of archiving, prevention of many attacks (see section 4).</p>

*Table 2: Implementation best practices*



## 2 Algorithm Taxonomy

The choice of an algorithm may be done according to functional, technical, legal, or commercial concerns. Thus, it may be useful to propose an algorithm taxonomy based upon different criteria. In this section we propose to sort algorithms according to their:

- Technical characteristics
- Typical usage
- Legal or commercial status

### 2.1 Technical Characteristics

- Unkeyed (hash functions)
- Symmetric (stream and block ciphers)
- Asymmetric (also known as public key algorithms).

Figure 1 proposes a taxonomy of cryptographic primitives and mechanisms based on their technical characteristics. Commonly used algorithms sorted according to this taxonomy are given as examples.

It should be noted that agreement of which algorithms to use is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for interoperability. A scheme implementing a cryptographic service must also ensure consistent understanding of encoding, padding, compression and filtering of data. These methods are not a main part of this document but discussed briefly where appropriate.

#### 2.1.1 Primitives




Figure 1: A technical taxonomy of cryptographic primitives and mechanisms

Note that algorithms shown in this Figure are examples not recommendations.



### 2.1.1.1 Un-keyed (Hash Functions)

The most important un-keyed cryptographic primitives are hash functions. Cryptographic hash functions take as input a message of arbitrary length and produce a fixed length message digest, providing three properties listed below:

- 1 **Collision resistance** meaning it is infeasibly hard to find two messages that map to the same message digest under the hash function.
- 2 **Second pre-image resistance** meaning it is infeasibly hard to find a second message that has the same message digest as a given first message.
- 3 **One-wayness** (also known as *pre-image resistance*) meaning it is infeasibly hard to find a message that maps to a given message digest.

The three properties are related, with collision resistance implying second pre-image resistance, which in turn implies one-wayness. If the collision resistance of a function is broken, the second pre-image resistance and one-wayness properties may still hold.

Most hash functions are specifically designed for this purpose, such as the SHA family including SHA-224 [99]. There are also hash functions based on a modified block cipher, like Whirlpool [38] or on generic block ciphers [37], or functions based on modular arithmetic [39]. A hash function can also be derived from block ciphers where the key required by the algorithm is no longer secret and may be derived from the message to be processed: see ISO/IEC 10118-2 [35].

A hash function is normally employed as a component of a data integrity mechanism<sup>1</sup>. It is generally a central component of a digital signature scheme.

Examples: SHA-2, Whirlpool

### 2.1.1.2 Symmetric key

The most relevant symmetric key primitives are block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block ciphers provide a key-specific reversible mapping of a given message block to a cipher block. Stream ciphers produce a pseudo-random stream from a given key, which can be used to encipher a message.

Block ciphers are more versatile than stream ciphers, in that they facilitate constructions both for encryption and for message authentication codes (MACs). On the other hand, although usually still quite efficient and designed for hardware implementation, block ciphers are generally less efficient than pure stream ciphers. Numerous high quality international standards for block ciphers are available.

Stream ciphers are generally very efficient and suitable for hardware implementation and are thus often used for confidentiality protection in high-speed telecommunication applications. Often they are proprietary algorithms and their specifications are confidential.

Examples: Block Ciphers (AES, TDES)

### 2.1.1.3 Asymmetric Key

Asymmetric or public key primitives have two different keys, a public and a private key, where data may be transformed under the public key, but the transformation can only be inverted using the private key. This enables non-repudiation functions, certain one-to-many and many-to-one

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<sup>1</sup> E.g., integrity protection of the hash of a message can provide integrity protection of the message itself.



schemes and exchange of secret keys without a pre-existing secret channel. Public key primitives are usually much less efficient than symmetric key primitives. For that reason, they are generally only applied to small amounts of data, and where the asymmetric property is advantageous. Typical applications include key exchange, key encapsulation, signatures and hybrid encryption (see for example 2.1.2.2, and 2.1.2.4).

Examples: RSA, Diffie-Hellman

## **2.1.2 Elementary Constructions**

In this section we review the most common constructions in which the primitives discussed above are used in actual applications.

### **2.1.2.1 Symmetric Encryption**

Symmetric encryption is used to ensure confidentiality. Communication partners must hold the same (symmetric) key to encrypt or decrypt a message. Symmetric encryption can be constructed from block ciphers or from stream ciphers. Block ciphers are more flexible than stream ciphers and generally quite efficient, but not as efficient as stream ciphers.

Stream ciphers generate a reproducible, pseudo-random key stream from the key, that is generally used to encipher a message using bitwise modular addition. Note that stream cipher encryption is always malleable, allowing the manipulation of the transmitted data, even if confidentiality is assured.

Block ciphers can be used in one of several modes of operations to encrypt a message.

Details of the modes can be found in section 3.2.1.1.

### **2.1.2.2 Asymmetric Encryption**

Asymmetric (or public key) encryption is used to ensure confidentiality. In the case of message transmission a sender uses the recipient's public key to encrypt the message, while the recipient uses the corresponding private key for decryption. The recipient's public key may have been obtained from a trusted key directory, for example. This allows for effective key management, when many senders are to encrypt data for a single recipient (e.g. e-mail encryption).

A popular way of establishing trust in keys is the use of public key certificates. Public key certificates may be published in an online key directory but with a trusted authority's signature (see 2.1.2.4 below) certifying the owner of the key. Prospective senders then only need to hold the authority's key in order to be able to establish secure communications with the intended recipient.

Asymmetric key encryption is generally not very efficient, and therefore mostly used for small data items such as symmetric keys i.e., for hybrid encryption as described below.

Examples: RSA-OAEP (PKCS#1 [114], ANSI X9.31 [73], ISO/IEC 18033-2 [58]), EL-GAMAL, ECIES (IEEE P1363 [145] ISO/IEC 18033-2 [58]), Paillier ([197]).

Typically a public key is used for encrypting an ephemeral symmetric key which is then used for encrypting the message. The recipient uses its private key to decrypt the ephemeral key and then uses this to decrypt the message.

See section 3.2.3 for more information.

Examples: S/MIME, SSL, TLS





### 2.1.2.3 MAC

Message authentication codes (MACs) are used to guarantee message authenticity and integrity. Communication partners must hold the same (symmetric) key. Then upon transmitting a message over a public channel the sender using the key computes a MAC, which is attached to the message, and can be verified by the recipient using his key, ensuring authenticity and integrity of the received message.

MACs are generally constructed from hash functions or block ciphers using cipher-block chaining.

Examples: HMAC (ISO/IEC 9797-2, mechanism 2 [28]), CMAC (ISO/IEC 9797-1, mechanism 5 [27]) and CBC-MAC (ISO/IEC 9797-1, mechanism 1 [27])

### 2.1.2.4 Signatures

Signatures employ the properties of asymmetric primitives to allow for non-repudiable authentication. To sign a message it is usually hashed with a cryptographic hash function to obtain a short message digest. The digest is then transformed with the signer's private key to obtain a signature.

Any holder of the signer's public key can check if a signature authenticates a message under the corresponding private key, but public key holders are unable to generate signatures themselves. As such the signature uniquely authenticates the message as originating from the signer, enabling non-repudiation services.

As with asymmetric encryption, public keys can be published in a public directory.

Examples: RSA-PSS (PKCS#1 [114], ISO/IEC 9796-2 [25]), DSA (FIPS PUB 186-4 [85], ISO/IEC 14888-3 [48]), ECDSA and similar schemes (ISO/IEC 14888-3) [48]

## 2.2 Typical Usage

Elementary constructions may be classified according to the security services or functions they are suited for:

- Confidentiality protection
  - Data confidentiality,
  - Key encapsulation,
  - Key establishment.
- Integrity protection
  - Data origin authentication,
  - Entity authentication,
  - Non-repudiation.



The following table shows which kind of elementary construction is considered suitable for a given usage:

Construction Usage	Symmetric Encryption	Asymmetric Encryption	MAC	Signature
Data confidentiality	Yes (one to one)	No (1)	No	No
Key encapsulation	Yes (one to one)	Yes (many to one)	No	No
Key establishment	No	Yes	No	No
Data origin authentication	No	No	Yes (one to one)	Yes (one to many)
Entity authentication	No	No	Yes (one to one)	Yes (one to many)
Non-repudiation	No	No	No	Yes

Table 3: Matching of techniques and security functionalities

Notes:

- (1) Usage is possible, but the computational complexity is generally excessive for the given purpose.
- (2) Hybrid encryption as defined in section 4.1.2.3 is for data confidentiality and key encapsulation.

### 2.2.1 Confidentiality Protection

Confidentiality means that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. This is usually ascertained by means of encryption. An encryption scheme achieves confidentiality if an attacker cannot distinguish between any two given data items of his choosing once the data has been encrypted.

#### 2.2.1.1 Data Confidentiality

Data or message confidentiality pertains to stored information or to data being exchanged in a communication. A symmetric cipher may be used to protect the confidentiality of data in either scenario. Stream ciphers typically execute at a higher speed than block ciphers and have lower hardware complexity, but block ciphers are more flexible. An asymmetric algorithm can also be used to encrypt data but is for performance reasons only recommendable for small volumes of data. If many to one confidentiality is required, for instance for e-mail encryption, hybrid encryption is the method of choice.

#### 2.2.1.2 Key Encapsulation

Key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) are a class of encryption techniques designed to secure symmetric cryptographic key material for transmission. Key encapsulation is sometimes based on symmetric key schemes, but more generally uses asymmetric (public-key) algorithms. Public keys, which are only suitable for encryption of small data volumes, are used to encipher a symmetric key to be shared between two parties.



### 2.2.1.3 Key Establishment

Key establishment is the process of exchanging a cryptographic key between two parties, using cryptographic techniques. Asymmetric (public key) encryption techniques lend themselves to key establishment, because they allow the secure construction of shared secret keys from freely accessible public key certificates.

### 2.2.2 Integrity Protection

Integrity protection refers to messages arriving as they have been sent, or data being retrieved as it has been stored. Generally, one speaks about authentication when the assurance about message origin is only towards the communication partner. If there is an added requirement that this assurance be transferable to third parties as well, one speaks of non-repudiation of origin.

#### 2.2.2.1 Data origin / Message / Entity Authentication

Authentication means assurance that a message or data item has been delivered as sent by a specified communication partner. Entity authentication is the corroboration that an entity is the one claimed. Authentication can be achieved by means of MACs or digital signatures. MACs offer better performance, but signatures allow for authentication towards multiple recipients (one-to-many), as the public verification key can be freely distributed.

#### 2.2.2.2 Non-Repudiation

Non-repudiation means transferable (e.g. to a judge) assurance about the originator of a data item. Digital signatures are used to provide non-repudiation. Only the originator of the data holds the private key and can generate signatures. The public key can be freely distributed to receivers and third parties, allowing verification of data origin. Once a public key has been accepted as belonging to an originator, the originator cannot later repudiate signed data items, as he is the only party capable of generating such signatures. Symmetric techniques cannot provide non-repudiation, because sender and receivers hold the same key, making any receiver another potential originator of the message.

## 2.3 Standardisation

Cryptographic algorithms may be standardised by international standards bodies such as ISO (primarily by ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27) or by national bodies such as ANSI or NIST. Cryptographic algorithms might also be standardised by industry/technology-specific standardisation bodies such as the IEEE and the IETF or companies/consortia such as PKCS for RSA standards and SECG for elliptic curve standards. An algorithm that occurs or is referenced in a standard is usually published and open for scrutiny by independent researchers. Being able to withstand research and theoretical attacks for many years builds trust in such an algorithm.

Standards organisations, industry consortia or government agencies may also publish recommendations concerning key lengths or implementation guidelines for cryptographic algorithms.

Algorithms for military use are typically kept secret. Government algorithms may be released with the expectation that they will be used for government and civil business. An example of this is the algorithms and protocols made freely available by NIST. These are sometimes the results of public competitions (e.g. AES and SHA-3) and will frequently then be adopted as ISO standards.

Proprietary algorithms are usually designed for a specific industry but are often less well reviewed by the open cryptographic community, especially if they are kept confidential and so are not recommended for financial applications.



**EPC recommendation 1**

Only algorithms whose specifications have been publicly scrutinised (ideally with a public design phase), and whose strength has been assessed by crypto experts can be recommended. Algorithms specified in International Standards should be preferred. This recommendation also applies to algorithms for key generation.



### 3 Algorithm Related Design Issues

Cryptographic functions such as unkeyed hash functions, symmetric algorithms and asymmetric algorithms can be combined in many ways to achieve a variety of objectives. Often the cryptographic 'primitives' come as a standard toolbox, which can be used flexibly by many applications. Care must be taken when developing the compound functions from the primitive functions so as to ensure interoperability, security and efficiency.

This section describes the main primitives and ways in which they are combined.

#### 3.1 Primitives

##### 3.1.1 Unkeyed

###### 3.1.1.1 Hashes

Primitive hash functions are unkeyed and designed to create a short 'digest' of a long string of input data. These functions are designed to be one-way (i.e. difficult to find a pre-image of a given hash) and collision resistant (i.e. difficult to find two inputs that hash to the same digest). Most signature functions depend on the use of hash functions as do some asymmetric encryption functions (see section 0).

SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 are algorithms defined by NIST (FIPS 180-4 [84]) and that produce 160, 224, 256, 384 and 512-bit hash results, respectively. The longer result algorithms tend to be known collectively as the SHA-2 family. Together with Whirlpool (which produces a 512-bit hash result) and RIPEMD-160 [158] (which produces a 160-bit hash result smaller than the recommended minimum of 256 bits) they are now also standardised in ISO/IEC 10118-3 [38]. SHA-224 is based on SHA-256. Computation of a SHA-224 hash value involves two steps. First, the SHA-256 hash value is computed, except that a different initial value is used. Second, the resulting 256-bit hash value is truncated to 224 bits. In August 2015, NIST published FIPS 202 (and revised FIPS 180) thereby standardising SHA-3 that can produce 224, 256, 384 and 512-bit hash results (see [84], [88], [192]).

MD5 is an old algorithm producing only a 128-bit hash result (see section 5.1.3.4). MD5 has been so extensively attacked that it shall no longer be used.

There are also collision search attacks on SHA-1, first in 2005 (see [172]) and more recently by Marc Stevens, who has also developed a method [189] for discovering an attack attempt, given a message. If it is necessary for some reason (e.g., backward compatibility) to still support SHA-1, it is recommended to apply such a method. In 2015 a "freestart collision" for SHA-1 was realised (see [195]) which computed the first practical break of the full SHA-1 algorithm reaching all 80 out of 80 steps. In February 2017 researchers in Amsterdam (see [202]) announced a collision attack against the full SHA-1 algorithm without the benefit of a "freestart", allowing an attacker to create two different files that have the same hash value.

The 2017 attack confirmed in practice what was already known in theory, that the algorithm is fundamentally broken – its collision resistance is broken from 80 bits down to less than 64 bits and there is speculation that its pre-image resistance may similarly be reduced from 160 bits down to less than 128 bits.

In consequence, for message signing, MD5 should no longer be used and legacy message signing systems that rely on the collision-resistance of SHA-1 should be migrated to a member of the SHA-2 family or to SHA-3. In addition, [133] disallows SHA-1 for digital signature generation.



More recent research by Gaetan Laurence and Thomas Peyrin (see <https://sha-mbles.github.io/> and [213]) improves the previous SHA-1 collision attacks by using new techniques to turn collision attacks into so-called 'chosen-prefix collision attacks' where for any given prefixes P and P' the attacker might find two messages M and M' that begin with these prefixes and have the same hash. The authors showed that such collisions can be computed with a complexity of  $2^{63.4}$  SHA-1 calculations whereas ad-hoc SHA-1 collisions require  $2^{61.2}$ .

See Best Practices 2 and 3 in section 1.4.

### 3.1.1.2 Modification Detection Code

A block cipher may be used as a kind of hash function to compute a Modification Detection Code. In this usage, the key required by the algorithm is no longer secret and may be replaced by data that is being protected. This technique is described in ISO/IEC 10118-2 [37] where a 128-bit hash result is produced. The DES algorithm may be used to compute such an MDC (known as DES in MDC mode). Since 2005, 128-bit hash results are considered to be too short for general usage, so ISO/IEC 10118-2 [37] should not be used with 64-bit block ciphers.

### 3.1.1.3 Length recommendations

In the long term, hash functions with less than 256 bits output length should not be used. It is recommended to use SHA-2 or Whirlpool or SHA-3 (see Table 4). Where collision-resistance matters, legacy systems using SHA-1 should replace SHA-1 according to the above recommendations.

## 3.1.2 Symmetric Key

### 3.1.2.1 Triple DES (TDES)

The key length of TDES is 112 bits (for two-key TDES, 2TDES) or 168 bits (for three-key TDES, 3TDES). TDES consists of three invocations of the DES primitive. The key is split into two or three single DES keys. First the data is encrypted with the first key, then it is decrypted with the second key, and finally encrypted again with the first key (in case of 2TDES) or the third key (in case of 3TDES).

An ISO Technical Report (ISO TR 19038 [7]) on TDES modes of operation was published in 2005. This technical report specifies modes of operation consistent with ISO/IEC 10116 [23] and provides implementation guidelines specifically for TDES and the financial industry.

Further security considerations may be found in section 3.1.4.

### 3.1.2.2 Advanced Encryption Standard

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been developed by NIST as a replacement for DES and has been approved, as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 197 [86]), in 2001.

AES is a symmetric block cipher that supports block lengths of 128 bits and key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. It has been designed to be considerably more efficient than TDES. It is now standardised in ISO/IEC 18033-3 [60].

In [126] NIST has defined modes of operation for AES consistent with ISO/IEC 10116 [23].

Further information on AES may be found at: <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/>.

### 3.1.2.3 Efficiency

In software implementations, the computation of an AES encryption takes about as much as one or two DES encryptions. This implies that encryption of a file or a data stream by AES will be much faster than TDES, since TDES takes six encryptions per 128 bits.



In the special case of PIN block encryption, both DES and AES encryptions are just one block of data, but AES encryption will still be faster.

However, for PIN block encryption, the block size is an issue. Where the standard PIN block length (defined in ISO 9564 [2]) used to be 64 bits, which is smaller than the AES block length, the standard has now been updated to include a new PIN block format of 128 bits. This new PIN block format is called Format 4. New systems should be designed to support 8-byte and 16-byte PIN blocks.

### 3.1.2.4 Algorithm and Key length recommendations

#### EPC recommendation 2

- AES is the recommended standard for new systems.
- 3TDES is still acceptable in use cases where there is no concern regarding reduced block sizes.
- 2TDES may still be acceptable for legacy systems under specific conditions (see 3.1.4); plans should be made to migrate to AES.
- Single DES (56 bits) should be considered broken.

Note that 2TDES may have an effective key length of less than 112 bits if the volume of data enciphered under a key is large. See section 3.1.4 for more details on security levels of TDES. In general, due to potential internal collisions when processing large amounts of data ( $> 2^{b/2}$  blocks where  $b$  is the block size) under the same key, block ciphers with a larger block size (e.g. AES with 128-bit block size) can provide better security than those with a smaller block size (e.g. TDES with 64-bit block size). For examples see [200] and [199].

### 3.1.3 Asymmetric key

The primary asymmetric key primitives considered in this document are primitives whose security is based on the difficulty of integer factorisation, such as RSA and primitives whose security is based on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithms in a finite group (and related problems), such as DSA and Diffie-Hellman (DH). The latter category can be separated into those where the group is in a finite field (such as DSA and DH) and those where the group elements are points on an elliptic curve<sup>2</sup> (such as the elliptic curve versions of DSA and DH).

#### 3.1.3.1 RSA specific issues

An RSA key pair comprises

- A public key modulus  $N$  (that is the product of two large secret prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$ ) and a public exponent  $e$ .
- A private exponent  $d$  that is determined given knowledge of  $p$  and  $q$ .

The RSA public key operation (the basis for encryption and signature verification) applied to data  $X$  is  $X^e \bmod N$ .

The RSA private key operation (the basis for decryption and signature generation) applied to data  $Y$  is  $Y^d \bmod N$ .

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<sup>2</sup> In this case the attacker cannot utilise the faster algorithms which exploit the field structure of the group and so cryptographic keys can be shorter.



## Reblocking problem

It may be necessary to sign a message (with the sender's private RSA key) and then encrypt the resulting signature (with the receiver's public RSA key). One must be concerned about the relative sizes of the moduli involved when implementing this procedure. If the sender's modulus is greater than the receiver's there is a chance that the receiver cannot recover the signature.

There are different ways of solving this issue some of which are discussed in [143], for instance.

When requiring authenticity and confidentiality there are pros and cons as to whether messages should first be signed and then encrypted or vice versa. See section 3.4.3 for a discussion on this.

## Random padding and redundancy

The basic transformations that implement RSA decryption and signature generation (complemented by encryption and verification, respectively) are essentially the same but have diametrically different requirements, the first for confidentiality and the second for authenticity and integrity. This leads to different processing requirements in order to defend against one of the most basic types of attack, namely guessing (followed by application of the public RSA function to corroborate the guess).

With confidentiality,<sup>3</sup> the designer must ensure that the chances of an attacker guessing the plaintext are sufficiently small. So for instance with PIN encryption, padding with an unpredictable value must be introduced. This is to prevent an attacker who has an encrypted PIN-message from being able to exhaustively encrypt every possible PIN-message until the correct one is found.

With authenticity, the designer must similarly ensure that the chances of an attacker guessing a useful signature are sufficiently small. This effectively requires that a specified function introducing redundancy be applied to messages before applying the RSA private function (thereby reducing the probability that the application of the RSA public function to a signature-guess will result in a valid message). Such a function may be implemented by specifying fixed message headers and trailers and also by padding the message with data derived from the actual message (e.g. a modified copy of the message or a hash of the message).

A function introducing redundancy will combine message information with the hash value in order to create a specially structured field. Doing so may prevent some published attacks (for instance some attacks based on the multiplicative property of RSA), and allow the verifier to check the structure of the signed data before verifying the hash itself. Thus it will be possible to distinguish erroneous signatures:

- produced with a wrong private key (the redundancy is not respected)
- produced with the good private key over corrupted data or on a false hash value (the redundancy is correct, but the hash is wrong)

Current Standards address this requirement.

The mathematics and usage of RSA can be subject to far subtler attacks and the straightforward use of random padding and redundancy functions may not always be sufficient. [146], [147] and [148] provide useful starting points for further reading on this subject, [161] and [142] may also be consulted about RSA padding.

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<sup>3</sup> This point is not RSA specific and may be pertinent for any encryption algorithm.





## Computational Enhancements

RSA computation can be made significantly quicker for the owner of the private key if the implementation takes advantage of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Using the CRT the signer (or decryptor) performs calculations modulo each prime factor of the RSA modulus  $N$ , instead of performing the calculations modulo  $N$ . Because the factors of  $N$  are half the length of  $N$ , the CRT method is much faster. The CRT method requires that the prime factors of the modulus are kept and used for the computation involving the private key. These prime factors must be stored with the same level of security as the private key.

Using CRT when signing (or decrypting) is purely a local decision and has no impact on the signature verification process (or encryption process). CRT can make signing and decrypting 3 to 4 times quicker.

Some attacks on RSA implementations using CRT have been published. These attacks involve the controlled introduction of errors into the signature or decryption computation. They may be prevented by a sound design (e.g. verify generated signatures before releasing them).

RSA computation can be made significantly quicker for the user of the public key if the public exponent is small compared to the modulus. This approach is sometimes referred to as low-exponent RSA. Typical values for the exponent are 3 (low exponent) and 65537 ( $2^{16}+1$ ). The use of a small public exponent can deliver performance benefits for resource-constrained RSA encryption and RSA signature verification operations. However, the use of low-exponent RSA may expose the system to certain attacks when used to perform encryption operations without random padding. The use of secret random padding becomes even more important when using  $e=3$  (see for example [148], [154], and [155]). For example, the use of exponent 3 immediately reveals the plaintext if used for message encryption to at least three recipients (see [148]).

It is also possible to choose small private exponents in case the signature generation or decryption device is resource constrained. However, there are attacks against this approach (see for example [148]) and so normally it is recommended instead to use more powerful devices that enable the completion of signature generation and encryption operations using private exponents that are the same length as the modulus.

### 3.1.3.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) specific issues

#### Domain Definition

ECC keys and certificates are claimed to be shorter in terms of storage and communications than keys and certificates of some other schemes.

Whereas some other schemes, such as RSA, use ordinary integers for the underlying number system, ECC systems use points that are solutions for a particular elliptic curve, with the result that ECC systems require users to make a choice of parameters to define the *domain*:

- The *curve* itself – defined by two parameters  $a$  and  $b$ .
- The *base field* – defined by one parameter  $q$  that can be one of two forms; a prime number or a power of two (binary).
- A point on the curve defined as the *generator* – parameter  $G$ , with its *order* – parameter  $n$ .

For any given *domain* a large number of key pairs can be created resulting in public keys  $Q$  and private keys  $d$ .

In a large multi-user system, the domain parameters could be individually selected by each user or could be shared by mutual agreement. If the parameters are not shared, then the *domain* choice



becomes part of the public key. Typically, the domain parameters are some three times the size of the basic public key.

### Domain Sharing

If the domain parameters  $a$ ,  $b$ ,  $q$ ,  $G$  &  $n$  are all shared, then for each user the public key consists only of  $Q$ . This results in small public keys and the possibility of optimisation of hardware and software to suite the domain parameters.

If only the base field  $q$  is shared, the result is that the public key size increases significantly (threefold or more), but there may be an advantage from a security point of view.

Finally, if no parameters are shared, but become part of each public key, then there is complete freedom of choice of the parameters to the user, but a resulting further increase in the public key size, plus any implementation optimisations will have to be customised for each domain.

It should be noted that sharing domain parameters could increase the prospect of an attack since the rewards could be perceived as being larger and it may become possible to design attacks that exploit specific properties of the shared domain parameters.

### Computational Enhancements

Computational efficiency is strongly influenced by parameter choice and curves defined over binary fields, including Koblitz curves, are sometimes selected since scalar multiplication (the dominant computational step) is efficient. Binary fields can be represented in two forms; polynomial basis or normal basis – the former being most efficient for software implementations and the latter for hardware. However, care should be taken with implementations using binary fields as they are more patented and may be more vulnerable to mathematical attacks. For this reason, standardised curves over prime fields are recommended.

In addition to standardised curves such as NIST P-256, there are now many new innovative techniques proposed for ECC cryptography such as FourQ [201] and curve25519 specified in IETF RFC 7748 [104] (the authors of which cite advantages in performance and security compared to NIST curves).

If the *base* field is known in advance, then a speed-up can be obtained by pre-computing certain components of the calculation and storing as partial results – these are sometimes known as public key multiples. The technique is applicable for both signing and verification and can be extended if the public key is also known in advance.

#### 3.1.3.3 Comparison of RSA with ECC

With such speed-up efficiencies the signing performance for ECC can be several times faster than an RSA implementation, whereas the verification performance can be about twice as slow as RSA (using  $e=3$ ).

Storage of an ECC public key including *domain* parameters and public key multiples can take of the order of ten times the space of an equivalent RSA key. Storage of an ECC private key takes a little over twice that of an RSA key. Certificate sizes are comparable, with RSA certificates being some 30% larger for equivalent key strength.

For key generation, then for a known domain, ECC is much faster.

From a security perspective, ECC implementations are thought to be less susceptible to timing and power analysis attacks than equivalent RSA implementations, although not immune. Fault analysis attacks which leverage the Chinese Remainder technique used for RSA speed-up have no



equivalent in ECC implementations, however the random numbers used by ECC implementations are potentially a target for side-channel attacks.

The state of the art in cryptanalysis is not so clear, however, the best-known algorithm to attack ECC systems (Pollard’s rho<sup>4</sup>) is less efficient than the Number Field Sieve (NFS) algorithm used to factor RSA moduli - hence one reason why ECC keys can be shorter. A further advantage is that Pollard’s rho has no constant in the run-time formula (unlike NFS) and thus the security level for ECC can be more accurately predicted and the algorithm cannot be “improved” by developments that lower the value of the constant (although increased parallelisation might). Koblitz curves are slightly more susceptible and keys should thus be a few bits longer than for generally selected curves.

In August 2015, the US National Security Agency (NSA) released a major policy statement on the need for post-quantum cryptography and their preliminary plans to transition to quantum resistant algorithms [193]. The NSA believes the time is right to make a major push to design public-key cryptographic protocols whose security depends on hard problems that cannot be solved efficiently by a quantum computer<sup>5</sup>. This announcement and in particular certain peculiarities in the wording have puzzled many people and have given rise to much speculation concerning the NSA, elliptic curve cryptography and quantum-safe cryptography. A critical analysis on this has recently been published in [194]. See also section 3.1.5 of this report.

In the table below, the results of the performance comparison between the different algorithms for usage with digital signatures are listed:  $\tau$  stands for a negative point, while  $\sigma$  stands for positive point. For this table, RSA with 1024-bit keys is considered, and the security of the three algorithms is assumed to be the same.

	ECDSA	RSA	DSA
Complexity System Set up	$\tau$ (< hours)	$\sigma$ (<Minutes)	$\sigma$ (< Minutes)
Users computational capacity	$\sigma$ (simpler chip)	$\tau$ (more complex chip)	$\tau$ (more complex chip)
Users storage capacity	$\sigma$ (160 bits per key) (*)	$\tau$ (1024 bits per key)	$\tau$ (1024 bits per key)
Creation time digital signature	$\sigma$	$\tau$ (6 times ECDSA)	$\tau$ (4 times ECDSA)
Verification time digital signature	$\tau$ ( 4 to 7 times RSA)	$\sigma$	$\tau$ (28 times RSA)
Size digital signature	$\sigma$ (320 bits per sig.)	$\tau$ (1024 bits per sig.)	$\sigma$ (320 bits per sig.)

Table 4: Comparison of signature schemes

<sup>4</sup> Newer methods introduced by Antoine Joux against elliptic curves over binary fields are also important to note [199].

<sup>5</sup> For many years it has been known that both the integer factorisation problem (upon which RSA is based), and the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (upon which ECC is based), can be solved in polynomial time by quantum computers.



(\*) Note that system parameters and pre-computation storage may be significant and may need to be taken into account.

One can conclude that ECC signatures schemes such as ECDSA may have advantages over RSA and DSA in applications where the available computational or data storage capacity in the signer's hardware is limited, e.g. in smartcard applications. However, unless the system parameters (Base Field, Curve and Generator) are implicitly known by the verifier, then these also need to be stored and made available. Sharing and distribution amongst users depends on trust and risk issues and if none of the parameters were implicitly known it would add approximately an additional 1000 bits to the storage requirements for ECDSA.

In a similar vein, for maximum performance pre-computation can be used with a trade-off between the partial results to be stored and the amount of speed-up. For a twofold improvement approximately 1,300 bytes of additional storage are required.

### EPC recommendation 3

Except for systems where computational or data storage capacities are restricted, or where a strategic long-term migration is needed, there is no strong reason to move from RSA to ECC-based signature schemes.

#### 3.1.3.4 Algorithm and Key length recommendations

It is difficult to state precise requirements on key lengths without precise details of usage and implementation. However, it is recommended:

### EPC recommendation 4

- No longer use RSA keys of 768 bits and ECC keys of 130 bits, or less.
- Avoid using 1024-bit RSA keys and 160-bit ECC keys for new applications unless for short term low value protection (e.g. ephemeral authentication for single devices).
- Use at least 2048-bit RSA or 224-bit ECC for medium term (e.g. 10 year) protection (see [191]).
- For considerations regarding low exponent RSA, section 3.1.3 should be consulted.
- New systems should be designed with the agility to introduce PQC algorithms as and when they are standardised (see 3.1.5).

Further details are provided in section 3.1.4.

#### 3.1.4 Security levels

Cryptographic algorithms provide different “strengths” of security, depending on the algorithm and the key size used. The concept of algorithm “strength” expressed in “bits of security” is described in the NIST guideline on key management SP800-57 [130]. ECRYPT has published a yearly report on algorithms and key sizes [179] which addresses the same issue (the previous report was published by ENISA [191]).

Two algorithms are considered to be of equivalent strength for the given key sizes ( $X$  and  $Y$ ) if the amount of work needed to “break the algorithms” or determine the keys (with the given key sizes) is approximately the same using a given resource. The strength of an algorithm (sometimes called the work factor) for a given key size is traditionally described in terms of the amount of work it takes to try all keys for a symmetric algorithm with a key size of “ $X$ ” that has no short cut attacks (i.e., the most efficient attack is to try all possible keys). In this case, the best attack is said to be



the exhaustion attack. An algorithm that has a "Y" bit key, but whose strength is equivalent to an "X" bit key of such a symmetric algorithm is said to provide "X bits of security" or to provide "X bits of strength". An algorithm that provides X bits of strength would, on average, take  $2^{X-1}T$  to attack, where T is the amount of time that is required to perform one encryption of a plaintext value and comparison of the result against the corresponding ciphertext value.

Bits of security	Symmetric key algs.	Hash functions	RSA (key length in bits)	ECC (key length in bits)
80	2TDES (1)		1024	160
112	3TDES	SHA-224 SHA3-224	2048	224
128	AES-128	SHA-256 SHA3-256	3072	256
192	AES-192	SHA-384 SHA3-384	7680	384
256	AES-256	SHA-512 SHA3-512	15360	512

Table 5: Comparable security strengths (adapted from section 5.6 of [130])

Notes:

1. For 2TDES the key strength depends on the number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs the attacker has available. In those cases where the number is limited, as is often the case for card payment systems, a 2TDES key can provide as much as 112 bits of security. The depicted strength of 80 bits shown in the first row of the table occurs only when the attacker has the possibility and the incentive to collect of the order of  $2^{40}$  plaintext and ciphertext pairs. More generally when an attacker can collect of the order of  $2^t$  plaintext and ciphertext pairs then they can find one of the keys used with effort  $2^{120-t}$ . The most recent result related to this attack can be found in [196] in which the author shows that the plaintext and ciphertext pairs need not all be encrypted under the same key<sup>6</sup>, and then the attacker will expect to determine the key used for at least one of the pairs and, moreover, will be able to do so even if only partial plaintexts are known.
2. There also exist theoretical attacks on 3TDES and AES that reduce the key strength but require special "unrealistic preconditions" to be feasible. For example:
  - o [151] shows that with  $2^{28}$  fixed known plaintexts encrypted using 3TDES under different keys then one of the keys can be recovered with effort  $2^{84}$ .
  - o [177] shows that with  $2^{43}$  fixed known plaintexts encrypted using AES128 under different keys, one of the keys can be recovered with effort  $2^{85}$ .

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<sup>6</sup> It had previously been thought that the pairs had to have been created using the same key.



Section 3.4 of the NIST publication SP800-67 [131] makes the following observation on 2TDES and 3TDES<sup>7</sup>:

*“The security of TDEA is affected by the number of blocks processed with one key bundle. One key bundle shall not be used to apply cryptographic protection (e.g., encrypt) to more than  $2^{20}$  64-bit data blocks.*

*Note that this limitation applies to a key bundle with three unique keys (i.e., 3TDEA); the use of TDEA with only two unique keys (i.e., 2TDEA) shall not be used to apply cryptographic protection (see section 3.1).*

*Also, note that in the previous version of SP 800-67 (dated January 2012), 3TDEA was limited to processing  $2^{32}$  64-bit blocks, and 2TDEA was limited to  $2^{20}$  blocks. These prior limitations should be considered when processing information protected using the 2012 or the original version of SP 800-67 (e.g., determining the risk of accepting the decrypted information when the limit provided in this revision for 3TDEA is exceeded or the information was encrypted using 2TDEA).”*

Moreover in March 2019 NIST published a 2<sup>nd</sup> revision of NIST SP 800-131 [133] in which they disallow encryption of data using 3TDES after 2023. Similar recommendations have meanwhile been published by the German BSI [217] .

Consistent with the above, the EPC recommendation is to use AES rather than TDES for all new payment systems. EPC further recommends to only continue to use TDES in legacy payment systems for which the risk of doing so can be shown to still be acceptable.

When collision resistance is not required the security level of hash functions is doubled. The collision resistance strength of SHA-1 is about 63 bits.

- For DSA and DH the key sizes are comparable to RSA, with subgroup parameter comparable to ECC. For the purposes of these recommendations, RSA key lengths that, due to implementation constraints, are slightly less than 2048 bits (e.g. 1976 bits) have equivalent security to 2048-bit RSA.
- Some additional information on key strengths for AES and RSA and ECC is provided in [179], [184] and [185].

### **3.1.5 Quantum computing considerations**

For protecting long-term secrets, including secret keys, it might be useful to consider current developments in physics: there is a possibility that so called "quantum computers" could be built in the next decades on a scale that is relevant to breaking cryptography.

Such devices could solve certain cryptographic problems with lower complexity than current computers and so if these computers would become reality then new cryptographic algorithms would be necessary: these are called “quantum resistant” algorithms or alternatively “post-quantum crypto” algorithms.

In order to better assess the probability and impact of this happening, some supporting facts and observations are summarized hereafter.

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<sup>7</sup> Note that NIST Recommendation SP800-67 caters for the protection of any type of information, rather than specific payment transactions; it applies to “*all federal agencies, contractors of federal agencies, or other organizations that process information (using a computer or telecommunications system) on behalf of the Federal Government to accomplish a federal function*”.



### 3.1.5.1 Impact on cryptographic primitives

The crypto-breaking algorithms that would run on a quantum computer are very different from the algorithms that attack today's crypto such as the Number Field Sieve. The two quantum computer algorithms relevant for cryptography:

- *Shor's algorithm* reduces the complexity of solving both RSA and elliptic curve-based problems enormously. The key length increase needed to compensate for this results in key sizes that are not practical.
- *Grover's algorithm* seemingly enables a search of the key space of secret key-based algorithms in a time proportional to the square root of the key space. Grover's algorithm can also be applied to hash functions.

However further analysis of the small print of Grover's algorithm reveals that pre-quantum security can be maintained with less effort than doubling key lengths:

- 1 Grover's algorithm does not benefit from linear speed-up through parallelisation. To obtain a 1,000-fold speed-up when using Grover's algorithm a million quantum computers would be needed<sup>8</sup>.
- 2 In combination with this the quantum attack work function on AES-128 is estimated to be  $2^{101}$  where  $2^{64}$  operations are performed on a single quantum machine<sup>9</sup> and this indicates AES-128 could remain fit for purpose in many contexts. See also [212].

Indeed in [#008](https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/faqs), NIST notably stated that when taking all considerations into account, "it becomes quite likely that variants of Grover's algorithm will provide no advantage to an adversary wishing to perform a cryptanalytic attack that can be completed in a matter of years, or even decades". At the end of this FAQ NIST concludes that AES 128 will remain secure for decades to come.

Assuming (very) optimistically that attackers would have access to quantum computers that have the required performance (see 3.1.5.2), the following changes would have to be made to current cryptographic primitives to stay at a comparable security level:

- Current public key cryptosystems will have to be replaced by a new class of "quantum resistant" public key cryptosystems that is currently in development. As of this writing, no standardised efficient quantum resistant public key cryptosystems are available although some vendors have experimented with them (for example, Google have implemented a quantum secure key exchange algorithm for TLS 1.3). ISO and NIST have begun a standardisation work item but this is not likely to be completed before 2023. NIST has reduced the set of candidate post-quantum crypto algorithms to 7 'finalists': 4 key establishment algorithms and 3 signature algorithms (see <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/round-3-submissions>). NIST has also standardised stateful hash schemes that are quantum resistant [136].
- Secret key-based cryptosystems do not have to be replaced. Doubling of pre-quantum key lengths from 128-bits to 256-bits would maintain the pre-quantum security level against a

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<sup>8</sup>Grover's quantum searching algorithm is optimal, Christof Zalka, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9711070.pdf>

<sup>9</sup>Quantum Resource Estimation, Vlad Gheorghiu, [https://docbox.etsi.org/Workshop/2017/201709\\_ETSI\\_IQC\\_QUANTUMSAFE/TECHNICAL\\_TRACK/S03\\_THREATS/](https://docbox.etsi.org/Workshop/2017/201709_ETSI_IQC_QUANTUMSAFE/TECHNICAL_TRACK/S03_THREATS/)



quantum capable adversary with an 'idealised' Grover's algorithm, however considering the actual algorithm's details then such doubling appears unnecessary.

- Hash function based systems that require one-wayness will have to use hash functions such as SHA-256 that are (pre-quantum) collision resistant<sup>10</sup>, see [203].
- Although no quantum computing attacks on the data block size of block ciphers are known, Grover's algorithm could reduce the effort for dictionary-based attacks; therefore, block ciphers with small data block size (smaller than 128 bits) are to be avoided (or should strengthen mitigations against dictionary attacks).

### 3.1.5.2 Current progress in quantum computers

The most important measure for the performance of a quantum computer is the number of "qubits" it has. A qubit is a quantum bit in a yet unknown state of either 0 or 1, which will be revealed at the end of the computation. Gate time is also an important measure (this is currently 20Mhz, but risk assessments should anticipate increases).

For cryptographic purposes, the number of qubits needs to be at least as high as the number of key bits, but sometimes even much higher. This observation on its own suggests that secret key based cryptosystems might be impacted before classical public key cryptosystems like RSA (with thousands of key bits).

Moreover, implementations of qubits suffer from "decoherence" where the information is lost to the environment. This problem can be addressed by combining a number of "physical" qubits into "logical" qubits, dramatically increasing however the number of required qubits (e.g. increasing the number of qubits needed for breaking today's cryptosystems from thousands to millions).

Both aspects eventually explain why current estimates for the availability of quantum computers able to break specific cryptographic algorithms do so widely differ. At the time of writing, non-crypto-breaking quantum computers of about seventy physical qubits are available<sup>11</sup>, and much research is being done to increase this number. Current progress in this research suggests that quantum computers capable of attacking cryptosystems of hundreds, let alone thousands, of key bits are still decades away and would require resources similar to the Apollo space program (see for example "Status of quantum computer development" by BSI [215]).

Many parties that invested in quantum computer research feel the need to publish about the research, even though not much progress is obtained. This situation is not likely to change in the near future. For example, there are publications on factoring small numbers using a quantum computer that use Grover's algorithm rather than Shor's.

Note that quantum computers have nothing to do with "quantum cryptography" that uses physical principles to achieve security; these methods allow a different kind of protection that is outside the scope of this document. Currently, these techniques do not offer any advantages over "regular" cryptography.

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In view of quantum computing, if long term confidentiality (that is, for several decades) is

<sup>10</sup>This is because Grover's algorithm implies that there is not much difference between second preimage resistance and one-wayness (as defined in 2.1.1.1) anymore.

<sup>11</sup>This should not be confused with a completely different type of quantum computer that solve a very different type of problem and that apparently already exist with thousands of qubits (e.g. D-Wave 2000Q).





needed then use a 16-byte block cipher such as AES with a 256-bit key. AES-128 will remain fit-for-purpose for lower grade requirements.

### 3.1.6 ISO Recommendation for Financial Services

In the ISO Technical Report [3], ISO TC 68 provides a list of recommended ISO cryptographic algorithms for use within applicable ISO TC68 – Financial Services standards. It also provides strategic guidance on key lengths and associated parameters and usage dates. It should be noted that this ISO report was published in 2010 and is currently being revised.

The focus is on algorithms rather than protocols, and protocols are in general not included in this document. However, in some cases, for example for some key agreement and some authentication protocols, there is no "underlying" algorithm, but the protocol in a sense *is* the algorithm. In this case the mechanisms are included, in particular where they have security parameters that can be adjusted for higher or lower security.

Algorithmic vulnerabilities or cryptographic keys of inadequate lengths are less often the cause of security compromises in the financial industry than inadequate key management or other procedural flaws, or mistakes in the *implementation* of cryptographic algorithms or the protocols that use them. However, compromises caused by algorithmic vulnerabilities are more systemic and harder to recover from than other kinds of compromises.

This document deals primarily with recommendations regarding algorithms and key lengths. For standards on key management, see ISO/IEC 11568 [8].

The categories of algorithms covered are:

- Block ciphers
- Stream ciphers
- Hash functions
- Message authentication codes (MACs)
- Asymmetric algorithms
- Digital signature schemes giving message recovery
- Digital signatures with appendix
- Asymmetric ciphers
- Authentication mechanisms
- Key establishment and agreement mechanisms
- Key transport mechanisms.

This document does not define any cryptographic algorithms, however the standards to which this document refers may contain necessary implementation information as well as more detailed guidance regarding choice of security parameters, security analysis, and other implementation considerations.

## 3.2 Constructions

### 3.2.1 Symmetric Key Encryption

This report considers two types of symmetric key encryption: block ciphers in a mode of operation and stream ciphers.



### 3.2.1.1 Block Cipher Modes of Operation

A block cipher is a keyed function that encrypts an  $n$ -bit block of data, where  $n$  is a fixed characteristic of the cipher, or a chosen parameter. For the purposes of this report it is an example of a 'primitive' cryptographic function. Within the financial industry, TDES and AES are the most commonly used block ciphers. These ciphers have different block and key lengths as detailed below.

Block ciphers are standardised in ISO/IEC 18033-3 [60].

Messages exceeding the block size are partitioned into blocks and are then processed using the block cipher<sup>12</sup> in one of its Modes of Operation (see ISO/IEC 10116 [23]). The Modes defined in [23] are:

- Electronic Code Book (ECB)

This is the simplest mode. Each block of data is encrypted independently using the block cipher. This method can be subject to cryptanalysis based on known ciphertext (or "dictionary attacks") and so is rarely used for messages longer than one block. The use of ECB is discouraged except for exceptional purposes.

- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

This mode of operation is the most commonly used. It solves the problems with ECB mode by adding the last cipher block to the next plaintext block before encryption. Specifically each input block is first xor'ed with the encrypted text of the previous block (or an initialising vector for the first block in the sequence), and then the result of the xor'ing is enciphered with the block cipher.

The resulting cipher is secure under common definitions of security, but only if the initialisation vector added to the first block is chosen freshly random, independently from the entire message content.

- Cipher Feedback (CFB) and Output Feedback (OFB) modes

In their simplest form, the input message is partitioned into a stream of  $r$ -bit blocks ( $r \leq n$ ) and each block of this input stream is encrypted to a cipher stream block by xor'ing it with a key stream block:

- in CFB each key stream block is created by truncating to  $r$  bits the encipherment of a block of a feedback buffer containing previous cipher stream blocks (or an Initialisation Vector (IV) block if first in sequence).
- in OFB each key stream block is created by truncating to  $r$  bits the encipherment of the previous key stream block (or an IV block if first in sequence).

It may be noted that CFB mode is self-synchronising (decryption can start in the middle of a message without having to know the exact position in the key stream).

- Counter (CTR)

This mode operates like a stream cipher.

The input message is partitioned into a stream of  $r$ -bit blocks ( $r \leq n$ ). Each block of this input stream is encrypted to a cipher stream block by xor'ing it with a key stream block. Each key stream block is generated by encrypting an incrementing counter block. The first counter block is

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<sup>12</sup> For messages shorter than the block size, one block is built using a suitable padding technique.



initialized with a starting variable and it is important that this variable is such that the value of counter blocks never repeat during the lifetime of the key.

The five modes have different properties from one another (e.g. error propagation, self-synchronising) and security. They require specific techniques for partitioning into blocks (using padding bits and auxiliary data) and IV management. ISO/IEC 10116 [23] should be consulted for more information on these modes including their usage and security properties.

Other modes have been described in ISO TR 19038 [7]. These include pipelined and interleaved modes of CBC, CFB and OFB for TDES and Counter Mode.

Attacks on encryption in the last decade have led the industry to recognise that generic encryption should also be authenticated. Authenticated encryption modes are addressed in section 3.2.6.

### 3.2.1.2 Stream ciphers

A stream cipher is a symmetric key cipher where plaintext digits are combined with a pseudorandom cipher digit stream (keystream). In a stream cipher, each plaintext digit is encrypted one at a time with the corresponding digit of the keystream, to give a digit of the cipher text stream.

Stream ciphers may be found in ISO/IEC 18033-4 [61] and also include CHACHA20 as described by IETF in [108].

### 3.2.2 Asymmetric Encryption

Due to performance limitations, asymmetric algorithms are not recommended for bulk data encryption but rather for encrypting symmetric keys and performing signatures. Therefore, the typical way of using asymmetric cryptography for encrypting data involves hybrid techniques (see next section).

### 3.2.3 Hybrid Encryption

Hybrid encryption combines the key management advantages of asymmetric schemes with the efficiency of symmetric schemes.

Hybrid encryption can be understood as an asymmetric scheme based key establishment combined with a symmetric encryption scheme.

#### *Hybrid encryption using RSA*

To encrypt a message, a key for a symmetric encryption scheme (and optionally for a MAC) is chosen at random. The message is encrypted under the symmetric scheme (and optionally MACed). The symmetric keys are in turn encrypted with an asymmetric scheme under the receiver's public key. Both the symmetric ciphertext and the encrypted keys constitute the final ciphertext that is transmitted to the receiver. The receiver can recover the symmetric keys using his private key. He can then (optionally verify the MAC and) decrypt the message.

A good example of a hybrid encryption scheme is the RSAES-OAEP encryption scheme based on the Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) by Mihir Bellare and Philip Rogaway [150].

#### *Hybrid encryption using Diffie-Hellman*

To encrypt a message, the sender derives a random value using the recipient's public key. The random value is then used to derive symmetric keys that are used to encrypt the message. The random value can also be derived by the recipient using their private key who can then derive the same symmetric keys so as to decrypt the received message.

A good example of hybrid encryption using Diffie-Hellman is ECIES. See also section 4.2.5.



Hybrid encryption schemes are defined in PKCS#1 [114], in IEEE P1363-2000 [145] and in ISO/IEC 18033-2 [58].

### 3.2.4 MACs

If only data integrity or authentication is required for a message, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) can be appended to it. If in addition, confidentiality should be ensured, authenticated encryption should be applied, see section 3.2.6.

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*Although many legacy systems currently still use MACs based on DES or TDES, new systems should use CMAC based on AES, or HMAC.*

#### 3.2.4.1 CBC MACS

For CBC MACs, the MAC code is calculated as the final ciphertext block (often truncated to three or four bytes) of the CBC encrypted message. For computing MACs, the most commonly used block cipher algorithm is the TDES algorithm (more details on MAC computation may be found in ISO/IEC 9797-1 [27]).

Retail and wholesale requirements for MACs are defined in ISO 16609: “Banking - Requirements for Message Authentication using symmetric techniques” [6]. This standard, which combines and replaces two separate retail and wholesale MAC standards, identifies two approved implementations of CBC MACs that are defined in ISO/IEC 9797-1. Namely Algorithm 1 (plain CBC) using TDES as the block cipher and Algorithm 3 (CBC with two-key EDE on final block) using single DES as the block cipher. In regard to the security analyses Annex B of ISO/IEC 9797-1, the standard recommends that implementations of Algorithm 1 consider using Padding Method 3 (where the length is coded in the padding) and that implementations of Algorithm 3 consider using session keys. Furthermore, both implementations should consider using truncated MACs that are shorter than the block length (see also section 3.2.4.3).

The CMAC mode of NIST can be used to compute MAC values based on AES. See [127] and Algorithm 5 of [27].

#### 3.2.4.2 Hash MACS

Applications may sometimes need to build keyed authentication functions from hash functions. This may either be because the resultant function is faster or more secure or because they happen to have access to the primitive hash function but not an encipherment function. HMAC defined in ISO/IEC 9797-2 [28] is an example of such a function. A NIST standard FIPS 198 "The keyed-hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)" [87] which claims to be a generalisation of RFC 2104 [94] and of the withdrawn ANSI X 9.71 was published in 2002.

The MAC function described in ISO/IEC 9797-3 [29] use so-called universal hash-functions such as POLY1305.

#### 3.2.4.3 Length of MACs

MAC algorithms often output a data block that is then truncated to form a MAC of shorter length (e.g. CBC MACs that truncate the output from 8 bytes down to 4 bytes or in some cases even 3 bytes). This approach clearly reduces the amount of data that needs to be sent to the recipient but in certain circumstances it can actually increase security as it provides a would-be attacker with less information to work with.

However, an argument against the use of short MACs is that the chances of an attacker being able to guess a short MAC are greater than those for longer MACs. As a rule of thumb for estimating a



minimum MAC length, the cost of guessing a MAC value must be balanced against the profit for guessing it correctly, from the viewpoint of an attacker.

For example, if a MAC is used to protect a payment of up to €100, and an attacker can get away with a few inconspicuous attempts per day at €0.01 per attempt.

Then if the probability of guessing the MAC right is less than 1 in 10000, the expected gain of guessing is less than the cost of an attempt. The minimum MAC size is 14 bits in this case.

Annex B of [27] contains security analyses relating to length of MAC.

### **3.2.5 Digital Signatures**

Digital Signature functions typically use a public key algorithm, the private key providing the signature function and the public key providing the verification function.

In most cases, a digital signature function is a complex process in which one or more transformations may be applied to the data to be signed before the cryptographic operation is performed. This process is sometimes called a digital signature scheme.

The ISO/IEC 9796 [25] and ISO/IEC 14888 [46] standards and IEEE P1363 [145] describe signature schemes using Integer Factorisation methods (i.e. RSA [137]) and Discrete Log methods. The PKCS#1 [114] specification describes schemes based on RSA.

#### **3.2.5.1 Signatures with appendix and signatures with message recovery**

The most general type of digital signature scheme is one that conforms to the hash and sign paradigm. In this case the signed message comprises the whole message in clear appended with a signature block. This type of scheme is known as signature with appendix.

If, however, the message to be signed is very small and bandwidth is limited then a signature scheme with “message recovery” may be attractive. In this case the signed message comprises part of the message in clear appended with a signature block, and that part of the message not sent in clear is recovered from the signature block during the signature verification process. The bandwidth saving (i.e. the amount of message that can be embedded in the signature and therefore recovered from it) is upper-bounded by the key size less the hash size. Thus, if the message is small compared to the key then the whole message might be recovered from the signature and no part of the message need be sent in clear.

ISO/IEC 14888 describes signature schemes with appendix and ISO/IEC 9796 describes signatures schemes with message recovery.

The EMV specifications [124] use the first of the three RSA-based mechanisms standardised in ISO/IEC 9796-2, but this mechanism is not recommended for new systems.

#### **3.2.5.2 Length of Hash**

The length of the hash is important because:

- The application of the signature scheme may require that it be collision-resistant and in this case 160-bit hashes (which provide at most an 80-bit security level) may not be suitable.
- It must be consistent with the algorithm and key size.

#### **3.2.5.3 Efficiency**

This sub-section provides a comparison between three digital signature schemes: RSA [25], DSA [80] and a digital signature scheme based on Elliptic Curves [85].



## Comparison criteria for digital signature schemes

The following aspects are of importance with respect to digital signature schemes:

- Security
- The certainty that the digital signature is uniquely linked to the signatory and to the data being signed
- Complexity of setting up the system
- Here a distinction is made between the one-time generation of the system parameters (used by all users) and the generation of the key-material (user specific).
- Required computational capability of users' hardware
- The complexity of the hardware required for users to employ the system (e.g. a simple smart card, or a Pentium processor).
- Required data storage capability of users' hardware
- The required capability for storing the system parameters, public keys and private keys.
- Required time for creating a digital signature
- Required time for verifying a digital signature
- Required space for storing a digital signature (i.e. the size of a signature).

To employ digital signatures not only cryptographic techniques are required, but also other security techniques (e.g. hashing, time stamping, smart cards). Moreover, also non-technical measures (e.g. procedural, organisational, legal) and services (e.g. TTPs) are required. These are not discussed in this sub-section.

### 3.2.6 Authenticated Encryption

If a message requires both confidentiality and integrity protection, then one may use encryption with either a MAC or a signature. Whilst these operations can be combined in many ways, not all combinations of such mechanisms provide the same security guarantees. For this reason, special dedicated constructions have been designed and standardised in ISO/IEC 19772 [63]. These constructions can provide the optimum level of security and efficiency. They typically involve either a specified combination of a MAC computation and data encryption, or the use of an encryption algorithm in a special way such that both integrity and confidentiality protection are provided. The constructions are:

- OCB (Offset CodeBook)<sup>13,14</sup>
- AES Key Wrap (from NIST and RFC 3394)
- CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC)
- EAX (by Bellare, Rogaway and Wagner)
- Encrypt then MAC
- GCM (Galois/Counter Mode)

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<sup>13</sup> OCB patent status can be found at <http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/ocb/>

<sup>14</sup> Note that OCBv2.0 has been recently broken and should not be used (see <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1040>, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1087>, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1090>, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/311> and is currently being removed from ISO/IEC 19772.



These methods can provide both confidentiality and authenticity/integrity protection under the same symmetric key and provide better performance and simplified key management as opposed to separate encryption and authentication.

Another construction is MAC then Encrypt where the MAC is used as an IV for the encryption. This kind of method has a proof of security in the form of SIV [183] and has been standardised in ISO 20038<sup>15</sup> *Banking and related financial services - Key Wrap* [14] and is used to protect keys<sup>16</sup> using AES.

Another popular method for authenticated encryption is the combination of CHACHA20 with POLY1305 as described in [108].

For further information on authenticated encryption see [179].

### **3.2.7 Distributed ledger technologies**

#### **3.2.7.1 Introduction**

A growing number of financial institutions are investing in distributed ledger technology (DLT) projects. The stated objectives of these investments often relate to transaction cost savings, business process streamlining, expedient and more efficient service deployments and immediate transaction settlement in the absence of a central counterparty.

Distributed ledgers refer to databases distributed across multiple sites (network nodes) - typically connected in a peer-to-peer network architecture - with each node sharing a consistent copy of the database. Dedicated distributed ledger network nodes confirm the integrity/ authenticity of proposed changes and proceed to update the ledger dataset through a decentralised consensus protocol. Consensus protocol types used comprise (i) Proof of Work, whereby computational power is used to solve a hard problem before the solution is submitted for validation to other network participants (ii) Round Robin, whereby nodes take turns to introduce changes to the ledger, (iii) Proof of Authority/Identity, whereby the ability of a node to introduce changes to the ledger is determined by the identity of the entity that operates the node and the reputation of the node among network participants; (iv) Proof of Elapsed Time, whereby nodes are assigned random (and verifiable) waiting times before they are allowed to introduce changes, (v) Voting protocols, whereby candidate database changes are submitted for approval to designated/approved network nodes that subsequently vote to commit a proposed change to the database using a number of protocols<sup>17</sup> that may incorporate protection against corrupted/malicious or unavailable voting nodes as detailed in [216].

Distributed ledgers that have no restrictions on which node can introduce changes to the ledger (permission-less) often use a “Proof of Work” based consensus protocol. A disadvantage of such a protocol is the large amount of computational effort and resources that is needed to obtain sufficient security and associated power consumption and dedicated hardware costs.

Committed updates to a distributed ledger are subsequently broadcasted to as many network nodes as possible to deter attempts by malicious adversaries to promote tampered versions of the database. Users will typically retain updated partial copies of the distributed ledger in their own

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<sup>15</sup> based on ANSI TR31

<sup>16</sup> sometimes referred to as key bundles or key blocks

<sup>17</sup> Random selection of staked users, leader-based, multi-round voting, coin-aging, delegate-based



devices and seek access to multiple nodes that contain full copies of the distributed ledger before submitting a change to its contents.

### 3.2.7.2 Blockchain networks

A specific type of distributed ledger is a *blockchain* where all database records are cryptographically bound (“chained”) together in contiguous blocks. Thus, a blockchain allows users to verify the sequence of committed database changes and to review all previous changes to a database record. This process makes sure that older entries are progressively harder to forge, but intrinsically delays the attainment of consensus until a number of newer blocks have been produced.

Blockchains can be categorized based on their permission model, which determines who is authorised to update them (publish new blocks). Blockchains that allow anyone to publish new blocks are categorised as *permission-less*; blockchains that allow only particular, authorised users to publish new blocks are *permissioned*. Permission-less blockchain networks underpin the operation of major cryptocurrencies. Permissioned blockchain networks are typically deployed by groups of individuals or organisations that know each other to facilitate the secure exchange of assets.

The functional characteristics of a blockchain (decentralised operation, transaction integrity protection, usability in the absence of a central authority that ensures the integrity/authenticity of database changes) made it an attractive technology to use for the first widely-used cryptocurrency implementation launched in 2008, Bitcoin (BTC). Cryptocurrencies are digital assets that act as a medium of exchange and use some type of blockchain to secure transactions, to control the creation of new units and to verify the transfer of assets across parties in the absence of a central issuing authority. A number of cryptocurrencies are now widely used (BTC, Ethereum, XRP, Tether, BitCoin Cash, Chainlink, Litecoin) for payment and investment purposes. Cryptocurrencies have attracted a lot of support (and criticism) by retail users, technology providers, social media platform operators, financial service industry stakeholders and by financial service regulators. Additionally, a number of central banks are assessing the benefits of issuing digital currencies (CBDCs) that leverage blockchain technology and digital tokens to represent a centrally-controlled digital instance of an existing currency. The operation of organised cryptocurrency exchanges across the EEA and in the UK is now being regulated for anti-money laundering (AML) purposes. Most regulated financial service providers do not use cryptocurrencies in payment interactions with retail or corporate customers.

There is however, growing investment and financial services’ industry participation in dedicated distributed ledger architectures established by industry & technology consortia.

### 3.2.7.3 Security considerations

By design, distributed ledgers replicate data across a wide array of sites (network nodes); additionally, in permission-less blockchains users can review the entire blockchain at any time. This can have a potentially negative impact on the confidentiality of data stored in the blockchain that should be considered by potential users.

Blockchains use cryptographic primitives to secure underlying operations. These comprise hashes (using algorithms like SHA-256, Keccak<sup>18</sup>, RIPEMD-160) and asymmetric key cryptography primitives (ECDSA) to verify transactions and to derive user addresses.

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<sup>18</sup> Selected by NIST to as the winner of the SHA-3 competition





In that respect, the statements and Recommendations that appear in sections 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 3.1.4 and 3.2.5 on the use of (and long-term security properties afforded by) such primitives should be considered by users attempting to assess the security of a blockchain.

Key management recommendations for asymmetric algorithms - related to key generation, usage and lifecycle management - detailed in section 4.2 should also be followed by distributed ledger users.

A challenge that is specific to blockchains relates to the hijack of the consensus protocol that is used to review proposed changes and commit these to the blockchain (51% attack)<sup>19</sup>. To carry out such an attack, the attacker must garner resources to outpace the block creation rate of the remaining nodes of the blockchain network (holding more than 51 % of the resources applied towards producing new blocks). Depending on the size of the blockchain network, this may be a prohibitively expensive attack that can only be carried out by state-level actors. The cost to perform this type of attack increases the further back in the blockchain the attacker wishes to make a change. This attack is not technically difficult; it just carries significant cost associated with obtaining the necessary computational power. The robustness of the consensus protocol and its ability to recover from error conditions (duplicate changes caused by network latency, malicious or adversarial validator nodes etc.) is an additional parameter that blockchain users should consider.

Finally, the scalability and performance constraints of some blockchain implementations makes their use problematic for certain financial service use cases. The need to store/update all data pertaining to a blockchain may create problem for individual users if the general ledger continues to grow at a rapid rate<sup>20</sup>. Additionally, the speed at which a given block update is processed or committed in some blockchain network implementations may not be sufficient or acceptable<sup>21</sup> for certain use cases.

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Financial service providers that decide to deploy distributed ledger-based services or processes should:

- Confirm the security properties afforded by the distributed ledger to its users,
- Identify the cryptographic primitives used to validate and commit changes to the ledger and confirm the status of cryptanalysis targeting these primitives,
- Identify the consensus protocol used to commit changes to the ledger and assess the feasibility of a successful consensus hijack attack.

Further information on distributed ledger technology may be found in [81], [205] through [210], [214] and [216]. Additionally, the work of international standardisation bodies on blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (e.g. ISO/TC 307) should be monitored.

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<sup>19</sup> See “Majority Attack” in the Bitcoin Wiki, [https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Majority\\_attack](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Majority_attack)

<sup>20</sup> For example, the Bitcoin blockchain was 310Gb (in November 2020) and had grown 25% in size in the last 12 months.

<sup>21</sup> The Bitcoin blockchain is restricted to a sustained rate of 7tps, Ripple (XRP) can process 1700tps. The international payment card schemes can process over 20,000tps.



### 3.3 Domain of Application

Algorithms may be selected according to the domain of application for which they were designed or for which they are best suited. Such domains may be:

- Electronic and mobile banking,
- On-line transactions - retail (PIN generation or PIN verification),
- On-line transactions - host to host,
- Batch transfer of individual transactions,
- File transfer (EDI),
- Email,
- Electronic purse,
- Debit or credit cards,
- Secure back-up
- ...

When the domain of application is concerned, typical criteria that may be used to select the most appropriate algorithm and key management scheme may be:

- Expected performance (including response time requirements in interactive systems),
- Volume of data to protect,
- Key management suitable for an open or closed user group,
- Necessity to use a Trusted Third Party and acceptance of such a TTP by the users,
- Scalability,
- Costs (to set up the system and to keep it running),
- Perceived sensitivity of the data to protect,
- Requirements on how long time protection is needed
- ...

### 3.4 Implementation and interoperability issues

#### 3.4.1 Security protocols

As soon as different applications using cryptographic techniques must interact many design issues must be addressed. The choice of appropriate algorithms and modes of operation is the most obvious decision to make but is far from being sufficient. Data formatting issues, padding or redundancy rules, filtering of binary results, interactions between compression, confidentiality and integrity techniques, scope of application of the algorithms and bit ordering issues are examples of typical sources of operational difficulties.

Solving such problems may be easy in a closed user application, but if interoperability within an open environment is required, then all these issues must be resolved, if not by a previous agreement then automatically set up by means of a security protocol.

SSL or S/MIME in the Internet world are examples of such security protocols.

This issue is not covered satisfactorily by any international standard. The standards from the set of ISO/IEC 10181 "framework standards" [16] define the conceptual models for authentication, access control, non-repudiation, integrity, and confidentiality, but are not aimed at being sufficient to define unambiguously a security protocol.

**EPC recommendation 8**

In designing a security protocol, the following should be identified:

- the security service provided,
- the entities involved,
- the security verification values (MACs, hashes, digital signatures, ...) that will need to be generated and verified,
- the algorithms and their modes of operation,
- the key material to be generated,
- the random number generators to be used (e.g. key generation, challenges, padding),
- the key establishment material (this could be key names, encrypted session keys, public key certificates or certificate references, initialisation vectors if any, ...),
- unambiguous definition of the data used as input in the cryptographic mechanisms,
- the formatting techniques used in the signature generation/verification process,
- the transformation techniques used to represent binary data (known as filtering), if any.

As an example, one might consider TLS 1.3 (see [109]) which is a new version of the popular TLS secure messaging protocol that improves security over the previous versions:

- by fixing flaws in the protocol;
- removing support for insecure cryptographic protocols and ciphers;
- introducing the use of “ephemeral key exchange” to provide security against adversaries that store communication to break it in the future when private keys are exposed.

Since the publication of TLS 1.3 on March 21, 2018, it is time to reconsider which versions of TLS are sufficiently secure. At least, TLS 1.0 and 1.1 should no longer be used. Since its introduction in August 2008, TLS 1.2 provides protection against many security problems of the earlier versions of the protocol. All earlier TLS versions were supposed to have been updated a few years ago.

The restriction of the use of earlier versions of TLS (TLS 1.0/TLS 1.1) will help address communication security flaws; the enforcement of such restrictions must be the highest priority for financial service providers in order to secure remote communication sessions with their customers, partners and 3<sup>rd</sup> party service providers. The large internet browser vendors (Google, Apple, Microsoft and Mozilla) have all removed TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 support from recent versions of their respective browsers; all recent versions of mainstream browsers already support TLS 1.3 (see <https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/modernizing-transport-security.html>). Enabling (and promoting) the use of TLS 1.3 further increases security for remote communication sessions. The continued usage of TLS 1.2 is still acceptable to ensure backwards compatibility with legacy systems that are less frequently updated, especially if used in conjunction with ephemeral DH/ECDH cipher suites or HSM-protected Server keys.

The continued use of legacy systems that are still forced to use TLS 1.1 or TLS 1.0 for remote communications must be subjected to ongoing security risk assessment; those earlier TLS versions notably have known and easily exploitable vulnerabilities, under any of the following conditions:

- The TLS connection is public, i.e. exposed to the Internet,



- The TLS connection is used for browser-based access.

#### **EPC recommendation 9**

- Use TLS with secure cryptographic primitives and appropriate key sizes (c.f. 3.1.3.4),
- Enable TLS 1.3 support in all new systems (offers forward-secrecy by default),
- Enforce the use of TLS 1.2 or higher for all use cases (preferably with ephemeral cipher suites),
- Do not use TLS versions older than TLS 1.2 because of known and exploitable vulnerabilities (unless such use is approved in specific use cases through ongoing security risk assessment).

### **3.4.2 Data formatting issues**

Whenever hash functions are used for data integrity, it is essential that the input data for the hash functions is exactly defined, such as padding, representation, field sizes and the use of binary data.

The evolution of so-called 'padding oracle attacks' continues. Such attacks are particularly relevant to decryption algorithms that reveal whether a possibly tampered ciphertext is correctly formatted when decrypted. These attacks are especially relevant to PKCS#1v1.5 [114], PKCS#11 [121] and CBC encryption and may be avoided by the detection of such tampering (e.g. by using authenticated encryption).

### **3.4.3 Implementation rules**

As soon as different transformations must be applied to the data, the order in which these transformations are performed may be important. The transformations and their purpose are as follows:

- Encryption: to protect confidentiality - this may be absolute (such as for cryptographic keys, not to be seen as plaintext outside an HSM) or for transmission or storage
- Data compression: to reduce message or storage size
- Digital signature or MAC: to give origin authentication (asymmetric cryptography only) and data integrity - also for use in authentication
- Legal signature (asymmetric digital signature): to achieve the equivalent of a handwritten signature - which may achieve non-repudiation in the legal sense of providing evidence to a third party or a court as to intent (also known as electronic signature).

The following rationale should be considered in conjunction with the recommendations given below:

- Sending encrypted data that is not integrity protected enables attacks on encryption keys and plaintext through error analysis: it is better to encrypt first and then sign or MAC, so that the receiver can first verify the integrity of the ciphertext. But note: some signature algorithms are weaker when signing unintelligible data.
- Signing the data in plain text format is necessary for legal signature, but not for other purposes.
- Performance of encryption is better if there is less data to encrypt.
- Data compression of encrypted data has no effect.



The following basic principles should be respected:

- Separate keys should be used for each transformation (where relevant).
- Keys should be reserved for specific associated functions, and this association should be protected. For example, keys used for legal signature might be associated with that purpose through a public key certificate.

#### **EPC recommendation 10**

To achieve confidentiality and integrity protection:

- For the originator, sign the plaintext data first for legal signature (if required), then compress (if required), then apply authenticated encryption with the non-confidential data being treated as associated data (not encrypted).
- For the recipient, perform the steps in the reverse order. Verify that signatures are from an authentic source.
- The encryption and signature/MAC can be performed as separate steps or can be achieved by use of authenticated encryption (which also allows the use of traditional encrypt-then-MAC) or signcryption.

#### **3.4.4 Key management impact on interoperability**

As long as cryptographic techniques are used within closed user groups, any technically suitable and sufficiently secure key management scheme may be used.

When cryptographic techniques are used in an open environment, key management issues may become the major obstacle to interoperability.

It is commonly agreed that public key technology is better suited to open environment than symmetric algorithm technology. If symmetric algorithms are required and secret keys must be exchanged then using a mix of public key for key exchanges and secret keys for encryption is a good solution.

As long as the application concerned may be considered as "low-risk", use of commercial CA services may be an acceptable way of solving this interoperability issue. One danger is to use the root keys of too many commercial CAs simultaneously (such as is the case with current internet browsers). The security of such a system is as strong as the weakest of the CAs in the list.

#### **3.4.5 Implementation quality and side-channel attacks**

A bug in an algorithm implementation can transform a good algorithm into a bad one. Therefore, quality control during the development process and testing against other implementations of the same algorithms are crucial.

Implementation of protocols is equally important for the security of the protocol, and needs as much care as the implementation of the underlying protocols.

For high risk applications usage of evaluation criteria (Common Criteria or FIPS 140-2<sup>22</sup>) and of formal description languages may be considered.

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<sup>22</sup> A new version of FIPS 140-3 is currently under development and should be officially published in 2009.



Any component of a protocol using secret data is a potential target for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing attacks, glitch attacks, DPA). Generally, side-channel attacks need special equipment – for example malicious software on POS devices cannot be used for side-channel attacks.

It should be noted that timing attacks can be attempted at long distances, for example [163] describes timing attacks on SSL implementations performed over the Internet.

### **3.4.6 Algorithm OIDs**

OIDs or Object Identifiers are a mode of identification of objects originally defined in ASN 1 syntax, which is widely used today. For example, X 509 certificates make a very extensive usage of OIDs.

International standardisation bodies (e.g., ISO, IEC, ITU) have defined a hierarchical way of assigning OIDs, such that the same OID may not be assigned twice to two different objects.

On the other hand, nothing prevents standards writers or users to define new OIDs for an object, which has been already given one elsewhere.

So when designing a security protocol, or when creating a certificate request one must consider which OIDs will be used to identify the algorithms and algorithm parameters.

Choosing the correct OID is not always straight forward and implementers should refer to the relevant standard for the OID of the algorithm they are implementing.



## 4 Key Management Issues

This section focuses on issues related to key management. Section 4.1 addresses the management of keys used with symmetric algorithms (i.e. symmetric keys) and Section 4.2 addresses the management of keys used with asymmetric algorithms (i.e. asymmetric keys).

More information on this topic may be found, for instance in: HAC [143], ISO 11568-1 [8], ISO/IEC 11770-1 [40], ISO/IEC 9594-8 [22], Davies and Price [141].

These Guidelines do not address any particular commercial products for key management. Specific key management techniques may be imposed by the device being used and in this case the device vendor’s instructions should be followed.

### 4.1 Symmetric algorithms

This section describes key management for symmetric algorithms, and in particular block ciphers, covered by ISO 11568-2 [9] and ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41]. For many years TDES has been the most commonly used block cipher in the financial industry typically using double-length (112 bits) keys. However, many new systems - especially those providing general security protection - are implemented using TDES with triple-length (168 bits) keys or the AES block cipher with 128, 192 or 256-bit keys.

Key management involves the managing and protection of cryptographic keys throughout their lifecycle – from generation to active use to de-activation and destruction. Such key protection includes both key confidentiality and key integrity, often with separate "superior" keys providing various levels of protection. This section of the Guidelines primarily discusses key confidentiality for symmetric keys, however the requirements for key integrity are similar (e.g. Key MAC'ing Keys instead of Key Encrypting Keys).

#### 4.1.1 Key generation and derivation

Keys should be generated in a TRSM (Tamper-Resistant Security Module) – as described in standard FIPS PUB 140-2 [83] and ISO 13491. The TRSM should have a master key that is generated inside the TRSM and never exists in clear text outside the TRSM.






Figure 2: Example of key hierarchy for symmetric keys

Key encrypting keys are also generated in the TRSM but may be exported for backup/storage encrypted under the master key (or a dedicated recovery key that is encrypted under the master key). Master key generation is therefore the most sensitive as this key encrypts all other key encrypting keys.

Access control mechanisms should be implemented that provide Dual Control over the TRSM. This prevents a single person from generating or accessing the master key on his or her own.

- Access control mechanisms are used to control access to the systems operations. Typically, the users must log on to the system with a password or a PIN and a smart card to get access to the operations. In key management, smart cards are often used because they are more secure than passwords<sup>23</sup>, and may have many other applications.
- Dual control means that the operation needs (at least) two people. Typically, in the case of master key generation the first person logs on to the system and generates the first key component in the TRSM (which in the case of TDES is a full-length 128 bits or 192 bits component with parity bits). Then the second person logs on to the system and generates the second key component in the TRSM. The two key components are now combined (e.g. XOR'ed together) and the result is the new master key. This scheme also supports backup of a master key whereby each component is securely retained by the person that generated it so that no single person knows the master key. More complex secret sharing systems such as Shamir's threshold scheme may be used (described in [143]). When generating a new master key for a TRSM all keys protected by the old master key must be decrypted and re-encrypted under the new master key. This is an example of **key translation** and specially designed secure functionality must be supported in the TRSM for this purpose (see the paper "The unbearable lightness of PIN cracking" at [http://www.arx.com/files/Documents/The\\_Unbearable\\_Lightness\\_of\\_PIN\\_Cracking.pdf](http://www.arx.com/files/Documents/The_Unbearable_Lightness_of_PIN_Cracking.pdf)).

For key generation, it is critical that the TRSM use a good random source. Many implementations of cryptosystems have been broken on account of an inadequate source of randomness or 'pseudo-randomness'. This topic is discussed in [143] where an extensive bibliography on randomness may be found.

Key derivation techniques are used when deriving keys from other keys (including card keys derived from issuer keys, session keys derived from fixed keys and symmetric keys derived during asymmetric key agreement) and from passwords or other secret data. Techniques for deriving keys from passwords such as PBKDF2 are standardised in NIST SP 800-132 [134] and PKCS#5 (IETF RFC 8018) [116]. Other credible techniques include SCRYPT (IETF RFC 7914) [105] and Argon2<sup>24</sup>.

#### 4.1.2 Key backup and storage

Subsidiary symmetric keys (i.e. those other than the master key) can be stored inside the hardware or encrypted outside. The advantages and disadvantages are comparable. Multiple copies of encrypted keys may be made in case a single instance is destroyed, but an intact master key will still be needed to decrypt it within the TRSM.

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<sup>23</sup> A PIN usually protects usage of smart cards, thus access control based on smart cards requires both possession of the smart card and knowledge of the PIN.

<sup>24</sup> <https://password-hashing.net/argon2-specs.pdf>



**EPC recommendation 11**

If a master key needs to be backed-up outside of a TRSM then it should be split into key components in a secure and resilient manner. Secret sharing techniques should be used to allow recovery of the master key from all or a fixed number (threshold) of the master key components. The security level of the storage of the master key components should be commensurate with the protection afforded to the operational master key itself.

**4.1.3 Key distribution**

In hybrid crypto systems (ones using both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography) data is protected using a symmetric key, and the symmetric key is distributed encrypted under the recipient's public key. Assuring the authenticity and integrity of this public key is paramount and techniques addressed in Section 7.2 may be used.

When using only symmetric cryptography, key-encrypting keys (KEKs) must be distributed or a hierarchic key derivation scheme may be used. KEKs are used to encrypt other keys. After the first KEK is interchanged between the parties, this KEK can typically be used to encrypt the successor KEK and so on. The first KEK distribution is then called the initialisation exchange. The security of this exchange must be very high, this means physical attendance of bank personnel who are responsible for the security of the system in question. If any of the KEKs is compromised then all its successor KEKs are assumed compromised. In this case a re-initialisation exchange is needed, and the old keys must be deleted.

The most difficult part of key distribution is most often the initialisation phase. It may require manual procedures such as:

- key components in sealed envelopes or smart cards
- face-to-face identification
- key components to be distributed by different channels
- installation of a security module with pre-installed keys.

For other symmetric key distribution schemes refer to ISO/IEC 11770-2 [41] and other references provided at the beginning of this section.

**4.1.4 Key installation**

Often symmetric keys are generated in one place and are used somewhere else. This could be two different machines inside the same organisation or it could be two parties in a communication, e.g. two payment service providers.

There are several ways to install these keys:

- Key split into key components: the key is split into components that must be combined (e.g. XOR'ed together) to form the actual key. At the most elementary level the key components may be securely printed in plaintext on different pieces of paper (key component letters). A separate trusted person holds each key component letter thereby providing split knowledge and dual control. This way of installing keys can be used when installing initial keys, e.g. initial KEK's between parties with different master keys.
- Smart cards: The key component letter installation method can be done more securely using smart cards (chip cards) with PIN. Each smart card contains a component of the key. When installing the key the person holding the card enters the PIN on the smart card reader and installs the component of the key.



- Encrypted installation: The key which is going to be installed is encrypted by a key-encrypting key (KEK). The sender's KEK must already be installed in the TRSM of the recipient and so no additional dual control is needed. This method is the simplest and most often used – the use of fragmented keys is only necessary to initialise or reinitialise a secure communication between parties.

When installing a key, especially if manual methods are used, its integrity should be verified. This can either be done using a MAC (using a pre-established Key MAC'ing Key) or by a key check value, which is calculated when the key is generated. This value is distributed with the key and the receiver of the key makes the same calculation and compares his result with the key check value. If they are equal the key is valid.

A common way to calculate a key check value for verification is to encrypt a fixed string (e.g. zeros or a pre-selected number) with the key, and the result is then the key check value. It must be noted that these key verification techniques are intended only to allow error detection during the key installation process.

#### 4.1.5 Key usage and key separation

To increase the level of security, one key should be dedicated to only one usage. Furthermore, the keys and their intended usage should be connected in a reliable way (key wrapping). Key usage information tells the system, what the key can (and cannot) be used for. This is sometimes called the key control vector (CV). All cryptographic operations other than those specified in the CV will fail. The control vector method only works if all parties involved use compatible CV's with the same certified TRSMs that enforce the key usage policy.

Key wrapping methods using AES and Triple DES are standardised in ISO 20038 [14] and x9 TR31 [82] respectively.

PCI SSC has mandates on the use of key wrapping in the form of "key blocks":

- [https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Cryptographic\\_Key\\_Blocks\\_Information\\_Supplement\\_June\\_2017.pdf](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Cryptographic_Key_Blocks_Information_Supplement_June_2017.pdf)
- [https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PIN\\_Security\\_Rgmt\\_18-3\\_Key\\_Blocks\\_2019.pdf](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PIN_Security_Rgmt_18-3_Key_Blocks_2019.pdf)

Use of TRSMs that make use of control vectors and key wrapping is recommended so that at least within a system the keys are used only for their intended purposes. See also NIST SP800-38F [128] [183].

Irrespective of the key wrapping technique used, key separation should be implemented.

#### **EPC recommendation 12**

Symmetric keys should be dedicated to one usage (e.g. encryption or MAC computation, but not both).

#### **EPC recommendation 13**

Key usage controls (e.g., making use of control vectors, key wrapping) which bind the key to key control information in a secure way should be employed.



#### 4.1.6 Key deletion

Keys should be deleted when they are compromised or expired. Key component letters should be destroyed after use. Storage media with old keys should be destroyed magnetically. EPROM should be destroyed physically.

#### 4.1.7 Key cryptoperiod

General principles of key cryptoperiod management should be based on ISO 11568-2 [9] and NIST SP 800 57 [130].

Whenever possible, session keys should be used. This means that instead of using the same key for many "sessions", different keys are used for different sessions. These session keys are typically derived (securely) from a single common parent key but may, as is the case with DUKPT x9.24 [71], be a sequence of keys where each key is derived from its predecessor using a 1-way function.

KEKs are less exposed than session keys and consequently their cryptoperiod may be longer. The precise frequency at which KEKs are changed will vary according to the level of risk – for low risk applications years may be enough, whilst for higher risk applications changing the KEK after several hours or days may be needed.

Master keys are even less exposed (but of course are more valuable) and so may be kept for longer periods (many months or even years depending on the risk exposure and type of application). In determining the cryptoperiod for master keys, the procedural risks surrounding over-frequent initialisations should also be considered, against infrequently invoked, perhaps forgotten, procedures.

## 4.2 **Asymmetric algorithms**

This section describes key management for asymmetric algorithms, i.e. public-key cryptography such as RSA, which is the most commonly used. For other key distribution schemes refer to the Diffie-Hellman protocol [115], [145], ISO 11568-4 [10] and ISO/IEC 11770-3 [42].

On Certification Authorities and public key certificate management, the reader is referred to ISO 15782 and ISO 21188 [15].

Asymmetric algorithms use key pairs comprising a public key and a private key. A key pair has several phases in its lifetime:

1. Generation phase. The key pair is generated and waiting to be activated.
2. Usage phase. The private and public keys are used.
3. Verification-only phase. The private key is no longer used (it may be archived or terminated) but the public key is still used e.g. for verification of issued certificates or digital signatures. This phase will last as long as the issued certificates or digital signatures are valid. This phase doesn't apply for key pairs used for data or key encryption.
4. Decryption-only phase. The public key is no longer used (for example because the public key's certificate has expired) but the private key may still be used for decrypting previously encrypted data or keys. This phase will last as long as the scheme requires. This phase doesn't apply for key pairs used for digital signatures.
5. Archival phase. The private key and/or the public key are archived from normal operational use. This phase could be omitted.



6. Termination phase. The private key is deleted, the public key certificates are revoked if not already expired.

#### 4.2.1 Key generation

Keys should be generated in a dedicated hardware security device.

The hardware should contain a TRSM (Tamper-Resistant Security Module) – described in standard FIPS PUB 140-2 [83], or in ISO 13491 [11]. The keys should be generated inside the TRSM and the private key should never exist in clear text outside the TRSM.

##### **EPC recommendation 14**

Keys should be generated inside the TRSM and the private key should never exist in clear text outside the TRSM.

As with the generation of symmetric keys, it is critical to use a good random number generator. Refer to section 5 for information on random number generation.

The generation of asymmetric keys will often imply usage of prime numbers and recommendations may be found to use 'strong' primes. Strong primes are prime numbers generated to have a particular structure that makes them more impervious to particular cryptanalytic attacks. Nowadays it is less necessary to explicitly require that prime numbers be strong, this is for two reasons: because all randomly generated primes of the size used in modern cryptographic systems will be strong with overwhelming probability anyway and, to a lesser extent, because new attacks such as elliptic curve factorisation are 'immune' to weak primes.

Algorithms used for generating primes for RSA should have been publicly scrutinized (see Recommendation 1) and should not be susceptible to Coppersmith's attack<sup>25</sup> (see for example the security flaw in the Estonian ID card<sup>26</sup> [211]). ISO/IEC 18032 [57] specifies algorithms for generating prime numbers that can be used for creating RSA moduli.

#### 4.2.2 Example of a hybrid key architecture

Private and public keys may be deployed within a fixed hybrid key hierarchy, for instance with the following keys:

- Master key: stored inside TRSM. Typically a symmetric key – e.g. double- or triple length DES key or AES key.
- Key-encrypting key (KEK) – optional. Typically, a symmetric key – e.g. double- or triple length DES key or AES key. Encrypted by the master key.
- Private key: e.g. 2048-bit RSA key – with corresponding public key. The private keys are encrypted by the master key or a key-encrypting key when outside the TRSM.
- Public key (corresponding to a private key) authenticity may be protected with a certificate created by a Certification Authority signature.
- Session key: key used in a protocol between nodes in a network. Typically, a symmetric key (e.g., single or double-length DES key or AES key).

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<sup>25</sup> see for example [https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/rsa\\_ccs17](https://crocs.fi.muni.cz/public/papers/rsa_ccs17)

<sup>26</sup> [https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/security\\_flaw\\_i.html](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/09/security_flaw_i.html)




Figure 3: A hybrid key hierarchy with asymmetric and symmetric keys (for data confidentiality)

#### 4.2.3 Key backup and storage

Public keys may be stored in plaintext in certificates outside the cryptographic hardware. Private keys can be stored in various ways, for example:

- Inside one piece of cryptographic hardware in plaintext (or even encrypted under a Master key).
- Outside but encrypted by e.g. a TDES or AES key (KEK). This KEK key must be stored inside the hardware or stored outside encrypted under the master key or another KEK. When a private key is needed it is taken into the cryptographic hardware and decrypted by the KEK inside the TRSM.
- Inside many pieces of hardware but in plaintext fragments (or even encrypted under a Master key) - securely and resiliently fragmented in such a way as to require co-operation of a threshold number of fragments in order to operate the private key.

The first two ways both have a very high level of security. The advantage of the first one is performance, but there is no backup of the keys. The second one has an easy way to make backup and the scalability is better, because only one key is needed inside the cryptographic hardware. The disadvantage is that the security of the KEK must be very high, a compromise of this key would lead to disclosure of all other keys and destruction of this key (and any backups it may have) would effectively destroy the private key that it protects.

The third approach is described as ISO 15782-1 [4] can provide the resilience of the second approach with the security of the first, however the fragments must be managed carefully. This approach can be modified to provide a secure procedure for back up (as opposed to operational storage) of private keys. With this modification a backup copy of the private key is fragmented using techniques similar to those used for symmetric keys – a threshold number of key fragments are needed to reconstitute the key (and only then can the reconstituted key be operated).



#### 4.2.4 Key distribution

The private key usually remains on the hardware that generated the key pair or within a secure environment concerned with production (e.g. smart cards). However, the public key must be distributed to the parties to whom communication will take place.

Distribution of the public key is a very important security issue. The receiver of the public key must be absolutely sure of the authenticity and integrity of the delivered and stored public key, i.e. he must be sure that the key belongs to the declared owner of the key and that the key has not been modified at a later point in time. If for example the original public key is replaced with a public key from a malicious person or organisation, then the receiver will be misled to accept false signatures on transactions, or send data encrypted with the false public key, which can be decrypted by the malicious person. So, the risk of public key substitution during its distribution requires appropriate security controls.

There are various ways to distribute public keys. For example:

- Electronically (e.g. download from a web site).
- Delivered on a disk.
- Public key in a certificate.

In the first method the integrity and authenticity of the distribution channel has to be provided e.g. by Transport Layer Security v1.2 or higher ([103], [109]) or by a multiplicity of sources (e.g. hashes published in national newspapers and website). The disadvantage of the second 'disk' method is that the distribution has to be performed either personally, which almost always is impractical in large user communities, or by post where the user must be sure that it is a genuine and unbroken envelope. Neither of these methods preserves the integrity of the public key after installation on the user's computer unless a hash or a MAC is applied. Where the operation of a certification authority is practical and appropriate the third method is therefore recommended.

##### **EPC recommendation 15**

Where appropriate, public keys are to be distributed such that their integrity and the binding with the owner are preserved (e.g. by using certificates).

A trusted third party called a Certification Authority (CA) must sign certificates. Certificate Management and Certification Authorities are complex subjects warranting separate discussion outside of this document.

For certificate management ISO TC 68 published two standards: 15782 [4] and 21188 [15].

Some PKCS specifications cover certificate management: certificate format in PKCS #7 [118] and certificate requests in PKCS #10 [120].

The widely used standard format for certificates is the X.509 [22].

##### **EPC recommendation 16**

Usage of X 509, version 3, format certificates is recommended.

Often there is confusion between public key certificate and attribute certificates. A public key certificate binds the identity of a person or an organisation to a specific public key. In an attribute certificate different privileges of a particular user are bound to the identity of the user or the serial number of their public key certificate. The lifetime of an attribute certificate is foreseen to be shorter than the lifetime of a public key certificate.



#### 4.2.5 Key agreement and forward secrecy

If the requirement is to establish a shared secret key (which might then be used for sending keys or messages from one party to another protected using symmetric techniques) then it is important to consider Diffie-Hellman key agreement and its EC-based variant ECDH (see ISO/IEC 11770-3 [42]) in conjunction with key derivation techniques (see ISO/IEC 11770-6 [45] and NIST SP800-56c [129]). If ephemeral or randomised EC keys are used in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement then it is possible to achieve forward secrecy whereby an attacker (who subsequently compromises the sender's or recipient's key store) is unable to determine the shared secret key that was established and the payload it protected. This property is considered to be very important for the new TLS v1.3 (see [109]).

#### 4.2.6 Public Key installation

Before an installation of a public key can take place, the validity of the public key and related parameters must be verified. This is done either as part of the distribution process or, if certificates are used, by using the public key of the CA which issued the certificate. The process of verifying certificates in a chain back to the trusted root public key is called validating the certification path.

#### 4.2.7 Certificate revocation and expiry

If a private key is compromised then the associated public key certificate must be revoked. The CA must keep updated information about certificate revocations. When verifying a certificate, users must have access to the most recent information about the certificate status. This may be provided by the CA distributing regularly Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) or giving interactive access to a certificate status database through an on-line protocol (OCSP).

A key pair and the related certificate have a lifetime that must be indicated in the certificate by a validity period. As soon as this validity period expires the public key must not be used any longer. Copies of expired certificates must be kept as long as there may be a need to verify signatures generated by the corresponding private key (the use of a trusted archive or time stamping techniques may be needed in this case – see ISO/IEC 18014 [52]).

When validating a certification path, it should be checked that no certificate of the path is present in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), nor expired.

#### **EPC recommendation 17**

When verifying a digital signature, users should check that the certificate status (either valid, expired or revoked) when the signature was generated does not make it invalid. When a certification path is involved, this verification should be performed for every certificate of the path up to the root certificate. Efficient verification may require that the date and time when the signature was produced is unambiguously defined.

If certificates are not distributed along with the signed message, then users should either have online access to up-to-date certificates or they should keep track of certificates in local databases and update the database when new certificates are issued.

A timestamp may be included in the signed message so that the signer can attest to the time the signature was created. An agreed time source may be sufficient for some implementations, however there are also certified time sources available, i.e. Time Stamping and Notary Services, which are being supplied by trusted third parties. Trusted timestamps allow the user to be sure of when the message was signed (in case they do not trust the signing entity for such things).



Similarly, a user must have access to a trusted time source when verifying signatures and certificates containing dates and times.

**EPC recommendation 18**

Whenever possible, trusted time sources should be used, in order to allow reliable verification of certificate validity.

**4.2.8 Key usage and key separation**

Public and private keys have different usage. For example:

**Public key usage:**

- key and data encryption,
- digital signature verification.

**Private key usage:**

- key and data decryption,
- digital signature creation,
- certificate signing for issuing certificates,
- CRL (Certificate Revocation List) signing.

Furthermore, an entity with a private key can authenticate itself to an entity that has the corresponding public key, and key pairs can also be used for establishing shared secret keys.

It is good security practice to have separate key pairs for different purposes, e.g. a separate key pair reserved for signing and another for encryption. In that way key recovery can more easily be implemented, as the private encryption key can be stored at a trusted place apart from the private signing key. Another advantage of key separation is that a large key is often required for signing, whereas shorter keys may be sufficient for short-term encryption, and different certification policies may apply to encryption and signature keys. X 509 certificates [22] contain an extension which indicates the purposes for which the certified public key is used.

**EPC recommendation 19**

An asymmetric key pair should be dedicated to one usage, for instance: one of entity authentication, data integrity, symmetric keys' encryption.

**4.2.9 Key deletion and archiving**

If a private key is suspected of being compromised the private key should no longer be used by the owner. Then the owner should delete any copy of it and request the prescribed entity (e.g., the CA) to revoke the relevant certificate. However, it may be necessary to archive the certificate as long as verification of signatures produced with the private key may be required.

**4.2.10 Key crypto period**

The crypto period of an asymmetric key pair is related to the size of the key and therefore to its cryptographic strength. A typical crypto period for RSA key pair will be measured in years. Considerations on key length and crypto period may be found in [9], [98], [142], [152], [153] and [158].





### 4.3 Key recovery and key escrow

Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.3 noted the importance of key backup to handle the situation where an operational key is accidentally destroyed or becomes unusable, for example in case of a natural disaster. This is referred to as key recovery.

An organisation may also need to make copies of secret keys available to law enforcement so as to meet national requirements on lawful access to data (see [131] and [204]). In such cases the keys should only be made available to appropriately authorised entities and with active participation of the organisation. This is referred to as key escrow.

#### **EPC recommendation 20**

Where possible, payment service providers should avoid the use of key escrow, but key recovery is part of their due diligence and business continuity obligations.



## 5 Random Numbers

The production of high-quality random numbers is critical for cryptographic applications, and indeed some implementations of cryptosystems have been broken on account of an inadequate source of randomness or "pseudo-randomness". An adequate source of randomness makes sure the generated numbers are not predictable.

The importance of good random number generation has received wide attention, especially in the area of prime selection for RSA key generation (see 4.2.1) where some internet research (see [190]) has revealed that a significant proportion (e.g. thousands) of TLS/PGP public keys shared common factors (and so could be broken). The cause of this is bad RSA key generation probably resulting from the use of bad random number generators or poorly seeded random number generators.

Random numbers can be generated using true hardware RNGs or using deterministic algorithmic methods, preferably both. If a deterministic random number generator is used, it must be seeded with an unpredictable source of information. Recommendations and requirements for generating random numbers can be found in the following standards:

- ISO/IEC 18031: Information Technology – Security Techniques – Random bit generation [56]
- ANSI X9.82: Financial Services – Random Number Generation [79]
  - Part 1: Overview
  - Part 2: Entropy Sources
  - Part 3: Deterministic Random Bit Generators
  - Part 4: Random Bit Generator Construction
- NIST SP 800-90A, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators [132]
- NIST SP 800-22, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications [125]

Most modern mainstream crypto libraries now include satisfactory functions for random number generation, however caution is recommended with older libraries. Examples of random number generators are recent versions of the following environments:

Programming environment	Random number source
Unix	/dev/urandom
Java	java.security.SecureRandom
.net	System.Security.Cryptography.RandomNumberGenerator
Python	secrets.randbits
C	libsodium (third-party library)

See the respective environments' documentation for details on how to use these crypto random generators.

Some applications require random numbers or random bit strings in order to ensure freshness of a cryptogram (e.g. in a challenge-response protocol) or to protect the private key in an elliptic curve



signing process. A standard approach for a device to derive such random values is to use a one-way function of an internal device state (at least 100 bits) where the internal device state is updated as a one-way function of a secret seed (at least 100 bits), time-varying data (e.g. a counter) and hardware entropy (if available).

Note that due to concerns regarding the security of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator (Dual\_EC\_DRBG) this method has been officially withdrawn from both NIST [132] and ISO 18031 [56] standards. Users of this random generator are recommended to switch to one of the other random number generators in these standards.

When using simpler hardware configurations, particularly without a decent built-in source of random generation, it can be challenging to achieve a high-quality production of random numbers. This particularly applies for Internet of Things (IoT) devices where the entropy can be very limited based on often-used sources of randomness, such as CPU cycles or a clock. In addition, fixed seeds across identical devices will contribute to poorer random number generation. Some alleviation to this challenge can be given by also considering other sources of randomness, such as timing of network packet reception or input from attached sensors.



## 6 ANNEX I: Terminology

### Definitions

Whenever a definition is copied without alteration from an International Standard, the reference of the standard is given.

**Asymmetric algorithm:** A cryptographic algorithm employing a public key and a private key. Together these form an asymmetric key set.

**Block cipher:** A cryptographic algorithm, which maps n-bit plaintext blocks to n-bit ciphertext blocks. “n” is called the block length or block size (both terms are used here).

**Confidentiality:** The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Cryptography:** The discipline, which embodies principles, means, and methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its information content, prevent its undetected modification and/or prevent its unauthorised use. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Cryptoperiod:** See key cryptoperiod.

**Data integrity:** The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorised manner. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Data origin authentication:** The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Decipherment:** The reversal of a corresponding reversible encipherment. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Decryption:** See decipherment. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Digital signature:** Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation (see cryptography) of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery e.g. by the recipient. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Encipherment:** The cryptographic transformation of data (see cryptography) to produce ciphertext. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Encryption:** See encipherment. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Hash function:** A (mathematical) function, which maps values from a large (possibly very large) domain into a smaller range. A 'good' hash function is such that the results of applying the function to a (large) set of values in the domain will be evenly distributed (and apparently at random) over the range. (ISO 9594-8 [22])

**Key:** A sequence of symbols that controls the operations of encipherment and decipherment. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Key cryptoperiod:** The time period over which a key is valid for use by legitimate parties.

**Key encapsulation:** a class of encryption techniques designed to secure symmetric cryptographic key material for transmission using asymmetric (public-key) algorithms.

**Key establishment:** A process whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent cryptographic use.

**Message Authentication Code:** A data item derived from a message using cryptographic techniques to provide message integrity and authenticity.



**Modification Detection Code:** A data item derived from a message using an unkeyed hash function to provide message integrity.

**Private key:** (In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair which is known only by that user. (ISO 9594-8 [22])

**Public key:** (In a public key cryptosystem) that key of a user's key pair which is publicly known. (ISO 9594-8 [22])

**Repudiation:** Denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication. (ISO 7498-2 [1])

**Secret key:** A key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques and usable only by a set of specified entities. (ISO/IEC 11770-1 [40])

**Signcryption:** A public-key primitive that simultaneously performs the functions of both digital signature and encryption.

**Stream cipher:** A symmetric encryption system with the property that the encryption algorithm involves combining a sequence of plaintext symbols with a sequence of keystream symbols one symbol at a time, using an invertible function (ISO/IEC 18033-1 [58]).

**Symmetric algorithm:** A cryptographic algorithm employing the same value of key for both enciphering and deciphering or for both authentication and validation.

**Unkeyed:** A cryptographic algorithm that only uses a message as parameter, in other words, no cryptographic key is involved.

**Abbreviations**

2TDES	Two-key Triple DES
3TDES	Three-key Triple DES
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ATM	Automated Teller Machine
CA	Certification Authority
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CFB	Cipher Feedback
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CRT	Chinese Remainder Theorem
CV	Control Vector
DEA	Data Encryption Algorithm
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DLT	Distributed Ledger Technology
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
DSS	Digital Signature Standard



DUKPT	Derived Unique Key Per Transaction
ECB	Electronic Code Book
ECBS	European Committee for Banking Standards
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ECIES	Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
EESSI	European Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative
EMV	Europay MasterCard Visa
EPC	European Payments Council
EtM	Encrypt then MAC
ETSI	European Telecommunication Standards Institute
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
GCM	Galois/Counter Mode
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IFES	Integer Factorization Encryption Scheme
ISO	International Organisation for Standardisation
ITSEC	Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
IV	Initialisation Vector
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KEK	Key Encrypting Key
MAC	Message Authentication Code
MDC	Modification Detection Code
MDn	Message Digest n
MQV	Menezes Qu Vanstone
NESSIE	New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OAEP	Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding
OCB	Offset Codebook Mode
OCSP	On-line Certificate Status Protocol
OFB	Output Feedback



PGP	Pretty Good Privacy
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PKIX	Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
PQC	Post Quantum Cryptography
PSS	Probabilistic Signature Scheme
PSSG	Payment Security Support Group
RFC	Request For Comments
RIPEMD	RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman
SET	Secure Electronic Transaction
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TC	Technical Committee
TDES	Triple Data Encryption Standard
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TRSM	Tamper-Resistant Security Module
TTP	Trusted Third Party
XML	Extensible Markup Language

*Table 6: Abbreviations*



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